FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report
Supplement

Central Eurasia

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FBIS-SOV-95-110-S
Thursday
8 June 1995

Central Eurasia
SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-110-S *8 June 1995*

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***U.S. Aid Programs in Russia Praised**

954Q0189A Moscow EKHO PLANETY in Russian
5 May 95 No 18, [Signed to press 26 Apr 95] pp 5-8

[Article by Petr Yemelyanov: America Has Given Russia...

[FBIS Translated Text] *Western aid to Russia long ago ceased to inspire a sense of euphoria. Now we are wiser; now we see how naive was our perception of kindly Uncle Sam from across the ocean, whose most cherished dream was to bring us material happiness. But when the U.S. Congress recently sized up the American program to build housing for our officers, the Ministry of Construction hastened to request that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs use its diplomatic channels to win support for the project. No matter how you look at it, $160 million is still $160 million... The author of this commentary had a rare opportunity to study from inside the mechanism by which American aid is delivered to Russia. We found his observations interesting.*

What do Americans get out of this? is the first question journalists always ask U.S. Embassy representatives at opening ceremonies for the latest project built in Russia with American money, whether it be a vegetable storage facility in Tula Oblast or homes near Volgograd for military personnel leaving the Baltic countries.

What do they get out of it? Can it be true that the Americans intend to solve their own problems one the backs of the long-suffering inhabitants of one-seventh of the Earths surface? As anyone knows, only your mother will love you and help you unselfishly. The image of expanding American imperialism is not yet banished from our minds, and it is being reinforced by a new, post-perestroyka skepticism toward the West. People are saying that Western ways do not suit us, particularly when it comes to iron discipline and an impenetrable bureaucracy (the foundations, incidentally, of any strong state). Finally, we are a great power ourselves. Sarcasm and hurt feelings always crop up in our conversations about aid. What do they have to offer us? They dont know what were up against! They treat us like an underdeveloped country! Some newspapers go so far as to portray all foreigners, particularly advisors to the State Property Committee, as spies. Why should they be helping privatize our enterprises? That looks very suspicious, particularly if you judge foreigners by the stars of Santa Barbara or all those action films.

Yet American supporters of aid to Russia feel that the money provided through the U.S. governments Agency for International Development (abbreviated USAID or AMR, depending on the language) contributes to the United States own security and a stable future. They believe that the agencys purpose in Russia is to facilitate the creation of proper conditions for development of a market economy. In its current form, the agency was created in the early 1960s under President John Kennedy, who believed that the United States should respond to the expansion of communism in Third World countries by providing aid to countries friendly to America. The end of the Cold War created new priorities, with the center of attention now shifting to the former Soviet Union. Today Russia is among the three largest recipients of American aid, the other two being Israel and Egypt.

USAID provides program funding. As a rule, these are joint Russian-American projects, or so-called partnerships, in the fields of medicine, business development or education. The USAID budget comes from U.S. taxpayers money and is approved by Congress. The organization is essentially a bureaucracy that provides a significant degree of funding to American consultants and American companies working in Russia. The Russian partner, if such a partner is sought, must be of interest to the Americans.

Incidentally, there is just as much skepticism in the United States about aid programs as there is in Russia. Moreover, on the Hill in Washington (i.e. in Congress) the question of whether the programs are appropriate is formulated almost the same way it is in Moscow: What do we get out of this? A now-classic phrase uttered by Senator Jesse Helms declared it was time to stop throwing money into the bottomless pit of unreformable economies when there are still so many poor and homeless people in America. The senator is not alone in his view of Russian reforms. But his is not the only opinion. In Washingtons corridors of power there are also individuals and forces that are staking something more than money on Russian reforms — they are betting their own reputations.

A strong Russia is in Americas interests, the White House says in response to its critics. Russia should be strong, the Kremlin agrees. And they appear to be correct. Yet everyone has a different interpretation of what the phrase a strong country means. To the Western countries, a strong economy is a sign of strength. And the Americans do not deny Russia the right to solve its internal problems by force. But when Russia slips away from the reform path, either in words or in deeds, that is perceived as a refusal to follow the rules by which the Western world plays.

When they help Russia, the Americans emphasize education and training, deeming it necessary to show through specific examples how a relatively normal society lives and functions (though they do not regard their

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own society as ideal). For that reason they bring our people over for visits of varying lengths to America. Retraining of specialists is the sum total of the projects being funded by various American organizations. Naturally this is to their benefit: in effect a portion of the budget funding allocated for aid stays in the aid providers accounts.

Approximately 2,000 Russian citizens and citizens of other CIS republics have gone to the United States to study at academic and professional centers. In the near future the NET Project (Exchanges and Retraining of Specialists From the Newly Independent States) should involve 5,000 Russian citizens (but definitely not the 50,000 reported in IZVESTIYA, and then only if Congress allocates the money).

For example, groups of 10-15 individuals have visited oil-producing regions of Alaska, there learning how black gold can be produced without spilling it into adjoining seas and lakes. Other groups have studied the organization of an election campaign (in Texas), the structure of the U.S. banking system (on Wall Street), how pharmaceutical safety is ensured, and how a free press works. True, our people did not discover anything in Washington that was new to them in terms of journalistic investigation — in our country things are considerable tougher. And groups have studied many, many other different areas, even gynecology.

As one might guess, these study tours provide theoretical knowledge and familiarization with the way Americans work. Each three-week visit costs American taxpayers $10,000-30,000. Participants visiting under technocratic programs (as a rule, technical specialists) have been pleased with the results. Those in the humanities, who study American political and democratic realities, have returned with mixed feelings.

Russias emissaries say, we got the feeling that they were studying us, not the other way around. And that is to be expected — the ordinary American does not know any Russians and has no idea what is in our heads. One thing that is in our heads, among others, are some ideas about America that are a far cry from reality. We know just as little about them as they know about us. For some reason citizens of the former USSR believe that across the ocean even the asphalt tastes like chocolate. Even cautious comments that other countries have problems, too, just different ones, are greeted with skepticism. One professional scholar of American affairs worked in the United States for more than five years, but only after taking a USAID trip did he admit that he was surprised at how high-pressure the American labor system is. That dictates certain characteristics of Americans behavior which seem to us like natural boringness. The trainees are offended when Americans compare them to Africans. (As if Africans or Pakistanis were not people! And, incidentally, up until now the Americans have worked mainly with Third World countries.) One group was shown a film designed for Namibians, and that offended them. But participants are most outraged when they are given pre-trip instructions reminiscent of local party committee lectures of recent memory: dont drink too much, dont proposition women. Of course, everyone in our country has had the proper indoctrination already, but how can you predict which participant will behave in an exemplary manner, and which will get drunk?

A high-ranking official of the Armenian Ministry of Health was detained and arrested by American police over a case of petty shoplifting. An official of the Russian Construction Committee was withdrawn from a program and sent home for attempting to undress a hotel maid. But these are just annoying but petty details, the sort of things that always happen when large-scale operations are carried out.

But Russians heavy drinking is what amazes Americans most. A chartered Delta flight with training program participants on board was detained at Shannon Airport in Ireland because one Russian citizen lapsed into a coma from excessive alcohol consumption. The captain refused to continue the flight with an unconscious person on board. When the passenger did finally come around and flew on to Washington, he was sent home. But he disappeared before he reached his destination. They found him (a former Komsomol leader) in an airport bar in Frankfurt — dead drunk. All it takes for some of our people is to board an American plane and see the free alcoholic beverages — very good ones, by the way — and their self-control and rational minds disappear, as if by magic. Americans are very surprised that prominent public figures and journalists in Russia have a problem with alcohol. After all, it seems clear enough: it takes a sober head to make effective decisions...

Probably the greatest changes taking place in Russia today are in peoples way of thinking. The Americans are trying to encourage that. At times it seems that Russia, without even noticing it, is slowing turning into the United States. Unfortunately there is not a single country in the world that can withstand Americas pervasive influence. MacDonalds, dinosaurs and Coca-Cola. We have not yet achieved their prosperity, but we are having to learn new habits — like watching our money and showing initiative. And those lessons are hard to learn. That applies not only to individuals, but to the entire country.

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Americans behave self-confidently and indulge in forceful solutions both near their borders and farther afield. But that is not an example that should be emulated. I repeat, when people in the United States talk about a strong country, they usually have in mind economic might. Yet in Russia, as recent events have demonstrated, the military sull has the final say. Despite it all, the Americans are convinced that Russia has no other option but to join the world economy.

Staff members of the Press Relations Division of the USAID mission in Moscow have told me that they consider the cases of Japan and Germany the best examples. After the United States provided aid to its principal World War II enemies they became Americas principal partners and allies (though their relations with the United States are by no means trouble-free). An equal partnership, despite some problems — that is how American politicians who are most favorably inclined toward us envision relations with Russia.

They realize that the main threat to the United States today is not the Soviet military machine; it is Russias instability. An accidental nuclear missile launch, a demographic catastrophe, a nuclear power plant accident. How can conditions be created under which those things would be impossible? The experts from Lyubanka are trying to convince people that America intentionally broke up the Soviet state, yet the collapse of the USSR caught America unawares, and America found the unpredictability of that collapse frightening. The world and the balance of forces in it changed overnight, and the rich Americans had to get used to the new conditions just like the impoverished Russians. And the Americans have more to lose!

They are sincerely convinced that personal freedom, private initiative, conscious choice and democracy are the basis for prosperity and therefore are attractive to all peoples. The Americans — at our urging, incidentally — believe that aid to Russia should be a fishhook, not just a fish. USAIDs strategy is aimed at supporting the non-governmental, private sector and free media.

Staff members of the Press Relations Division say off the record that Americans would like to encourage our country to develop along a civilized path on which it might even manage to avoid the mistakes made by the West.

In order to alleviate the threat of general instability we must cautiously bring into the world economy a country that was long cut off from a world dominated by the West. American experts tactfully term Russia not a developing country, but rather an industrial country with a deformed economy. It can only be reformed by developing it, and the office that handles aid is called the Agency for International Development.

The USAID mission in Moscow consists of offices based on areas which for Americans comprise the foundations of a modern society. Special divisions oversee projects pertaining to the rule-of-law state, the independent press, privatization, agriculture, the financial market, health care, environmental protection and the energy industry. Moreover, as Sergey Karaganov, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Europe Institute, has commented in discussions with Russian experts, even though the way American aid is organized is cumbersome and overly bureaucratic, it is more efficient than in other Western countries.

When I, deliberately provocative, asked Tom Rogers, head of the Press Relations Division, if his offices activities would result in the complete Americanization of our country, he just smiled in surprise. Could anyone possibly remake such a huge and uncommon country as yours? Our operations in Russia are temporary. As soon as your democracy and economic system become stronger, as soon as your government says leave, we will be gone. Another very important factor in the interest in Russias development is its immeasurable though very risky market. By providing aid to Russia, a government paves the way for its companies and its business.

The Americans are also driven to go to Russia by the risk, by the challenge that they love. They do not want to look like fools later because of fear and excessive caution. In this case USAID serves as a breakwater stretching out into the boundless waters of the Russian market...

If for the communists the people are the shapers of history, for capitalists it is consumers and producers. The highly efficient Western economy needs new markets, and there is nothing that can stop that market development.

As the star of the movie Meeting on the Elbe once said, the dollar is a bulldozer that crushes everything in its path.

* * *

A Home for an Officer

Two years ago in Vancouver, Bill Clinton offered Boris Yeltsin help providing housing for officers leaving the Baltic countries. Three months later, at a meeting of the G-7 countries in Tokyo, the American president announced a $160 million project to build 5,000 apartments. One year later an agreement was signed with the Russian Government.

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A 450-apartment pilot project was begun in Nizhniy Novgorod, Volgograd and Tula Oblast. The apartments, 60-70 square meters in size, range in price from $8,500 to $145,000. In the summer of 1994 U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering attended a ceremony marking completion of the first homes, which were built by Russian construction companies, incidentally. Another 370 housing units had been completed by the end of 1994. USAID opened the project up for competitive bidding, and the Ralph M. Pattersons Co. of Delaware (Parsons) became general contractor. Distribution of the housing is done by the social security divisions of Russian Federation embassies in the Baltic countries. Roughly one-fifth of the apartments are distributed in the form of certificates for homes that are already completed and have been made available by local governments.

In the United States the program to help provide homes for Russian officers has been the subject of serious debate and opposition in the legislative branch of government. VETERAN OF FOREIGN WARS magazine quoted one retired officer as saying: I served in the Marines for nine years, and now I live in a tiny trailer. I probably would have been better off to be a Red Army officer, rather than be insulted like this by America, which is building homes for its former enemies. Approximately 250,000 American veterans are homeless.

***'Security Line' Excluding Russia From Europe Deplored**

954Q0187A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian Apr 95 No 4, [Signed to press 07 Mar 95] pp 102-110

[Excerpts of article by Alla Alekseyevna Yazkova, doctor of historical sciences and chief scientific associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of International Economic and Political Studies: "Where Will the New 'Security Line' in Europe Run?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The paths and potential for ensuring European security, the substance of it, and the optimal contours and necessary guarantees of the inviolability of each of the states of Europe are a whole set of problems which is a focus of European and world politics. After the fall of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the USSR, and the emergence in Europe of a multitude of centers of armed conflict, the question of the geographical borders of security became an urgent one for most European states, especially those which are right next to the zones of instability.

With the complex experience of history on their shoulders, in the early 1990s the countries located in Eastern Europe—from the Baltics to the Balkans—had already begun to strive persistently to gain the protective umbrella of NATO, hoping to receive guarantees both against the spread of armed conflicts and, notably, in the event of the possible collision of their interests with the unpredictable intentions of conservative political groups of the former Soviet Union, and then later of Russia. In these conditions, the seemingly attractive ideas of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," the "all-European home" of the times of Gorbachev's perestroyka, or even "Europe From Vancouver to Vladivostok" became secondary or were seemingly forgotten. The situation which had taken shape could easily have occasioned running the boundary line of security along the borders of the former USSR, or possibly even the Russian Federation. In the first half of 1994, this was encouraged, among other things, by Russia's ambiguity toward the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program, which in the political circles of the countries of Eastern Europe was considered to be an attempt by Moscow to obtain from NATO not only recognition of Russia's special status in the proposed program but also assurance of the sphere of its "specific interests" in the Eastern European region.

The resolution of the question of where the new security line in Europe will run is thereby subject to the impact of many political factors. In connection with this, the most important things for Russia are: its renunciation, in deed rather than words, of vestiges of empire politics in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe; joint participation with these states in the "Partnership for Peace" program based on agreements with NATO taking into account its individual characteristics; and achieving a domestic policy consensus on a whole group of questions on the broadest possible social basis. Historical experience suggests that the alternative to this may be Russia's international isolation as a result of underestimating the political realities which have taken shape in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the totalitarian regimes and the dissolution of the bloc structures of Cold War times following that. The new "security line" would then come right up to Russia's borders. At least such a threat has already emerged more than once in recent years. [passage omitted]

The difficult and multilevel discussions regarding "expanding the zone of responsibility" of NATO in Europe led in November 1991 to the adoption of a palliative decision to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), whose members, in addition to the members of NATO and the countries of Eastern Europe, also include all states which are the successors of the USSR, among them Russia. Judging from the program of actions proposed by the NATO leadership at the December (1993) meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Brussels, NACC is above all an organization for holding

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mutual consultations, though certainly on a fairly broad group of problems, among them questions of military planning, peacekeeping, conversion, support of scientific research, and so forth. It cannot, however, adopt decisions which are mandatory in character or even offer the participants security guarantees.

Russia's attitude toward the eventual expansion of NATO's sphere of activity was meanwhile becoming increasingly ambiguous. In August 1993, B. Yeltsin announced the recognition of Poland's right to join the North Atlantic Alliance, which was also fixed in a joint Polish-Russian document.[1] The criticism which followed from Russian political structures, including the leadership of the former Supreme Soviet and military circles, revealed the obvious discrepancy in the positions of Russia's various political structures. The report by the Foreign Intelligence Service published after the October crisis of 1993 (the "Primakov Report") took a negative view of the possibility of the integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO. The report pointed out that this could reduce chances to decisively overcome the division of the continent and lead to relapses into bloc politics, and in a situation where NATO's zone of responsibility would come right up to the RF borders.[2] Opinions that this could lead to greater isolation of Russia, especially if the Baltic countries and Ukraine were to be integrated into NATO, were expressed during the discussions held in this connection. The necessary retaliatory measures would put an excessive burden on the RF state budget, while domestic reactionaries would obtain an even richer breeding ground.[3]

These considerations left their mark on Russia's new military doctrine adopted in November. Its provisions, which contrasted with the RF MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] concept outlined in the summer of 1993, produced the judgment in the West that today's Russia has "not one foreign policy but two complete ones, and possibly even more."

The results of the December elections of 1993 were unambiguously viewed outside RF borders as evidence of its profound internal political instability, the expanded influence of national patriots, and a possible change in its foreign policy course. In connection with this, in one of his speeches, V. Havel emphasized that Eastern Europe is unable to feel secure "while such strange people as Zhirinovskiy have appeared in Russian politics."[4]

And although these types of views reflected the state of affairs only in part, in late 1993-early 1994, the question of the boundaries of security in Europe became urgent once again. At the same time, a new stage of cooperation of Eastern European states, who directly demanded guarantees of their security from NATO, was also noted.

* * *

In early 1994, the Vyshegrad Group stepped up activities; in previous years the Group had been fundamentally weakened by the disintegration processes in Czechoslovakia and its subsequent dissolution and the Slovak-Hungarian disagreements connected to the status of the Hungarian national minority in Southern Slovakia, as well as the Slovak-Hungarian conflict over the construction of the hydroelectric power plant on the Danube. As for the economic aspect of mutual cooperation of the Vyshegrad Group countries, it never had a decisive role for them: trade with Czechoslovakia was only 5.1 percent of the total volume of Hungary's foreign trade turnover in 1990, while the corresponding figure for trade with Poland was only 3.2 percent, which could not be compared to Germany's share or that of the former Soviet Union. In 1991-1992, the proportion of their trade exchanges declined even more, which allowed the prime minister of Czechia, V. Klaus, to announce in one of his interviews in late 1992 that cooperation within the Vyshegrad Group was ineffective and its wisdom, doubtful. Nevertheless, in January 1994, its members once again united under a common political platform by putting the question of quickly developing criteria for membership in NATO and subsequently joining this organization on the agenda.

The leadership circles of the United States and NATO faced a complicated dilemma: on the one hand, the Clinton-Christopher administration's position was criticized for actually refusing to support resolving the question of NATO's expansion and admitting Poland, Hungary, and Czechia into the North Atlantic Alliance,[5] but on the other hand, the no less reasonable assertions of Clinton's supporters were heard that by soliciting full-fledged membership in NATO, the leaders of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe deliberately exaggerated the significance of the vote for Zhirinovskiy. The position of S. Talbot, the second most influential man in the U.S. State Department, was clearest on this score: "No new lines of separation in Europe."[6]

The U.S. administration's position ultimately proved to be the decisive one. In January 1994, the North Atlantic Alliance session in Brussels adopted the "Partnership for Peace" program, which was open for participation to all states which were members of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and had already been under development for several preceding months. The adoption of this program signaled not only the victory of common sense—any other decision which the members of the Vyshegrad Group had tried to

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obtain would have meant a step toward another division of Europe—but in addition the success of Russian-American cooperation. In connection with this, we must certainly mention that back in the summer and fall of 1993, A. Kozyrev was discussing with W. Christopher an alternative of the "Partnership for Peace" as an intermediate option which would appease the fears of the countries of Eastern Europe.[7] But the "Partnership for Peace" program itself, which included an "Invitation" and a "Framework Document,"[8] went beyond this concrete objective.

The provisions contained in the program for the most part confirm agreements reached on the CSCE level earlier: commitments to abstain from the threat of force or the use of force against either the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; and to respect existing borders and resolve conflicts peacefully. The framework document contains the concrete obligations of states cooperating with NATO: to help facilitate transparency (openness) of national military planning and budget appropriations for defense (this means submitting data already envisioned by CSCE documents); to provide democratic control over the state of the armed forces; and to maintain readiness to carry out peace-keeping and humanitarian operations together with NATO by mandate of the United Nations or the CSCE.

The framework document emphasized that each of the states would develop cooperation with NATO on the basis of an individual program designated in the presentation documents signed by both parties. These same documents establish the joint planning of operations, conduct of joint exercises, and "performance of other joint actions given the necessary accord." Moreover, mention is made of the "formation in the long-term perspective of forces which are more prepared to interact with the armed forces of the countries which are members of the North Atlantic Alliance," as well as the possibility of holding consultations with NATO if the participant in the program encounters a "direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security." The "Partnership" program did not present any other more definite guarantees, thereby ruling out the possibility of a priori pitting certain European states against others and running the "security line" along the western borders of the Vyshegrad Group. "We certainly cannot move the Berlin Wall to the East," announced the chairman of the committee of chiefs of staff of the NATO countries, J. Shalikashvili, during his official visit in January 1994.

The immediate reaction of the Vyshegrad Group countries to the program proposed by the North Atlantic Alliance revealed their disappointment and anxiety. L. Walesa openly criticized it, announcing the "error of the notions common in the West" that expanding the "zone of responsibility" in Europe would weaken democracy in Russia and strengthen imperial sentiments. "Yeltsin is actually running NATO and the West," the Polish president announced in a fit of temper. "As yet there is no partnership to be seen; there is Russia, which is a threat, there is the organized West, which is afraid, and we are in the middle."[9] Walesa was even disappointed with the procedure whereby the leaders of the Vyshegrad Group met with Clinton in Prague. The American president received them individually, and these audiences, according to the witty comment of one of the Czech politicians, resembled the waiting room of a dentist's office: "Next, please!"

V. Havel took a different position: "The world must become accustomed to the idea that we are talking of independent states and reject the habit of lumping certain countries into one basket." Czechia's desire to act individually in accordance with the "Partnership" program's wishes was not, however, supported by its allies. Regarding this, the Polish journalist and public figure, A. Michnik, wrote in GAZETA WYBORCZEJ: "It seemed that our peoples had drawn conclusions from the bitter lessons of Munich and Yalta and the Brezhnev doctrine when our fates were decided for us by others. But politicians calculated that it would be easier for them to step into Europe alone." It seems, Michnik concluded, that "the greatest political opportunity of the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the Hungarians in the 20th century may remain unrealized."[10]

Nonetheless, even in the first half of 1994, the Vyshegrad Group countries not only signed the "Partnership" framework document but even presented individual presentation documents. A total of 20 European states, among them Sweden, Finland, the Baltic countries, and most of the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS republics, had signed the framework agreement by 6 June.[11] It was Russia's turn, but Russia more than other countries, it seemed, was interested in making certain the Iron Curtain did not drop down on its western borders. However, it was precisely in Russia that the sharpest political debates on the "Partnership" program developed and a lack of unified approaches to problems of extreme importance to Russia—relations with NATO, Eastern Europe, and the countries of the "new abroad"—was revealed.

In part this can be explained by the political split in Russian society, the sometimes diametrically opposed views of the complex processes going on in the CIS and Eastern Europe. But even if an internal political consensus was achieved, a decision regarding the formula for the RF to join the program could not be a simple one. It was necessary to weigh all the "pro's" and "con's" and

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try to answer the main question—how will joining the "Partnership for Peace" or rejecting it affect the strategy of Russia's internal development and, accordingly, its foreign policy? Especially since after the framework document was signed (22 June 1994), there were even more serious discussions to come and, if not ratification, which this document does not formally need, the mandatory review of it in the Russian parliament.[12]

The arguments of the most consistent opponents of the agreement with NATO based on the proposed procedure (signing of the framework agreement and then formulation by each country of the conditions for subscribing to it based on the '6 + 1 formula) were laid out during the parliamentary hearings and meetings of the State Duma and in addition presented extensively in a number of periodical publications. They amount to the following.

The program proposed by NATO is unacceptable because the country's national interests presuppose that it will preserve its status as a "great power" and its independent path of development. Consequently, Russia must be prepared for temporary international isolation and be prepared to carry out the integration of "post-Soviet space" as quickly as possible, to declare the state budget the main source of investments, and to implement a set of measures to bring about an upsurge in the domestic market and domestic production. In other words, what was proposed was actually rejecting the strategy of reforms adopted and switching to isolationism not only in relations with the West but, what is inevitable, also with those CIS countries which have already joined the "Partnership for Peace."

The theory that the NATO bloc will inevitably be strengthened on the program's basis, its strategic influence will become established in Eastern Europe, and the NATO infrastructure will reach the borders of the CIS countries and even Russia is another argument against Russia's support of the NATO program.[13] In the opinion of political scientist V. Chernov, "NATO was, is, and will be designed exclusively for military-political deterrence, in the past of the USSR and now of Russia. While we used to speak of deterring Soviet expansion," the author emphasizes, "now the task is posed of perpetuating the dissolution of the Soviet Union, weakening Moscow's military-political position, and putting its foreign and military policies under the West's control."[14] This same theory was played on by A. Migranyan, who asserted that "the problem of the expansion of NATO is the danger of Russia's strategic isolation."[15]

The arguments made during the discussion which developed that refusing to participate in the program would put relations with the United States, the European Community countries, and NATO on a plane unfavorable to Russia but would not lead the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics as well as the CIS states which supported the program to refuse also did not convince those who supported a negative view of the "Partnership" program. And if the program went ahead without the RF's participation, that was when it would prove to be objectively directed against the RF. This development of events would ultimately throw Russia back to Cold War times and would entail its further technological backwardness compared to the developed industrial states, not to mention that with international isolation it would be forced to abandon the policy of reforms. The unpredictability of Russia's actions in the event of a return to totalitarian policies, which is extremely likely under these conditions, alarms its neighbors most of all, forcing them to try to obtain full-fledged membership in NATO and other European military-political alliances.

In May 1994, all the former members of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria) and the Baltic countries signed an agreement in Luxembourg granting them the status of "associate partners" of the Western European Union (WEU). Prior to this they had all joined the "Partnership for Peace." In its editorial, the newspaper KHUVUDSTADS BLADET, published in Helsinki in Swedish (10 May 1994), called this event the setting of a "new boundary line" in Europe—from Finland in the north to Bulgaria in the south. The newspaper called Russia's unwillingness to subscribe to the "Partnership for Peace" program under the same conditions which the others had accepted one of the main reasons for what had happened. Moscow's attempt to obtain, as the Eastern European states believe, special status for Russia with specific national security interests in Eastern Europe forces them to take steps toward the quickest possible close rapprochement with the Western defense community.

And although the WEU, remaining in the shadows of NATO, is not an influential military organization in Europe and becoming associated with it, according to the view of the Polish ZYCIE WARSZAWY (11 May 1994), represents to the states of Central and Eastern Europe "joining the Western military structures through the back door," the significance of this event should not be underestimated. The moment they signed the agreement, the nine countries became members of a European structure related to the European Community, that is to say, they obtained the possibility of interacting within the framework of a unified Europe.

Russia's, in light of the above, belated signing of the framework document of the "Partnership for Peace" in June 1994 produced a new wave of internal criticism.

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The negative consequences of this step were viewed as follows:

—Russia's subscribing to the program means de facto recognition of NATO as the only universal structure of European security where for the foreseeable future the RF will not have a decisive voice in adopting decisions;

—the prospects for military-political consolidation of the space of the former USSR will be blocked and the significance of the Treaty on the Collective Security of the CIS Countries will be lost;

—the prospects of by-stage expansion of NATO without Russia's participation but with its de facto approval will become a reality;

—Russia's special role as a peacekeeper, arbiter, and guarantor of the stability of the geopolitical space of the former USSR will be impaired;

—Russia's significance as a great power possessing nuclear weapons will be devalued;

—tension will arise in Russia's relations with the Muslim world, India, and China, since it can then be considered a NATO advance outpost in the East;

—finally, the planned joint measures and transition to standardization of weapons will lead to the final degradation of the Russian military-industrial complex and its loss of markets in the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS.

We must acknowledge that there were also constructive considerations in the discussion which developed after the framework document was signed. It is important, however, to take the main thing into account: once again, even though belatedly, Russia managed to cross the "line of isolation" which, if it had refused to cooperate with the overwhelming majority of European countries which supported the NATO program, could easily have become their security border—from Finland to Bulgaria.

In evaluating the possible options for Russia's participation in the "Partnership" program, we must certainly not ignore the circumstances of its appearance. On the eve of the June (1994) session of the NATO Council in Istanbul, the French LE FIGARO (10 June 1994) noted that Russia's participation was absolute necessary in creating the new architecture of security in Europe. But neither can we speak of cooperation within the framework of a Yalta No 2, as the NATO deputy general secretary, S. Balantsino, indicated. It seems that these are precisely the considerations which ultimately determined the appearance of NATO's January initiative. As the authors of the Information Report of the Center for Political and International Research emphasized in March 1994, in NATO circles this initiative was also viewed as a step in response to Russia's desires and fears regarding the prematurity of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics joining NATO as full members. During the meetings and conferences held after this initiative was proposed, NATO representatives were saying that it took considerable effort to "convince" the leaders of Hungary, Czechia, and especially Poland to postpone the prospect of full-fledged participation in NATO. Representatives of these same countries, and in addition the Baltic countries, noted with marked annoyance that the West's taking Russia's fears and warnings into account and its unwillingness to enter into a confrontation with Russia forced the NATO Council to retreat to compromise positions. But if Russian politicians do not take more decisive steps on this issue, Central and Eastern Europe will undoubtedly again insist on full-fledged membership in NATO, instead of the compromise which was adopted for Russia's sake but which in fact did not suit Russia.

One can understand citizens living in these countries. Among Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles, memories of "fraternal friendship" with Russia's totalitarian predecessor within the framework of the Warsaw Pact are still fresh. Historical experience also suggests they must fear the two giants, Russia and Germany, between whose territorial space their isle of security lies. As for Germany, its leading politicians, having learned the lessons of the two world wars of the 20th century, are in no way inclined to play the Eastern European card. "We do not want the 'directorship' of NATO and Russia in the matter of security in Europe," minister of foreign affairs K. Kinkel stated on the eve of the Istanbul meeting of the NATO Council. The same idea was expressed by the head of Britain's Foreign Office, D. Hurd, who emphasized that relations with Russia must be based on the principle "No vetos, no surprises—and increasing cooperation."[16]

It follows from everything said that the optimal and perhaps the only possible option for Russia can be its cooperation with the European states under the conditions proposed by the "Partnership" program. The basic danger to Russian reforms and to the future of the RF on the broader scale is the prospect of its isolation and the appearance of the "boundary of European security" on its borders. As for the question of Russia's "special status" in the "Partnership" program, formally granting it and creating "characteristics of Yalta" in Eastern European minds could hardly help pacify their turbulent region. In addition, the essence of the matter is always more important than the form—the signing in 1949 of the North Atlantic Pact by the United States

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under the same conditions as the small countries of Europe did not diminish the United States' real weight and influence in NATO.

It is therefore not the pursuit of privileges in existing military-political blocs which seems most essential, but decisively overcoming the division of Europe by creating transcontinental European structures. In this connection, the initiative of the prime minister of France, E. Balladur, who back in April 1993 proposed a draft Pact on Stability in Europe which received new impetus after the START conference of 16-27 May 1994, is extremely timely and important. This document is based on the provisions of the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and its main objective is practical realization of the principles included in the Charter. The Pact, among other things, is supposed to "create for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe political soil that fosters the conclusion between them of bilateral good neighbor treaties."[17] The very same kind of treaties may be concluded on a bilateral or regional level between other European states which when necessary can bring in mediators who are freely chosen by the sides. The agreements developed as a result of these negotiations will be integrated into the text of the Pact on Stability and signed by all participants, which should be the final result of the entire process. Needless to say, the adoption of this procedure would make all talks about a threat from Russia pointless by creating additional impetus for stabilizing the Russian course of reforms. Especially since the need for a close dialogue with Moscow was also emphasized in Western political circles, which suggests the West's desire to see Russia as an important political partner on the European continent.

Balladur's draft was approved by the Istanbul session of the NATO Council and, no less important, the role of the CSCE as a most important factor for guaranteeing security, democracy, and human rights in Europe was stressed specially.[18] In this sense the positions of NATO and Russia, in our opinion, are very close. In fact in an interview for the Interfaks Agency, B. Yeltsin described the Russian concept of all-European cooperation like this: the central element—the CSCE as the priority region-wide political forum and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as the prominent mechanism of military-political partnership—will provide coordination of the activities of all other structures. The CSCE must be profoundly reformed, its mandate must be changed, and it must be transformed into an operational branch of the United Nations in Europe in order to do this.

The CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in early December 1994 marked a new and to a significant degree unexpected turn in the discussion regarding the role of the CSCE and NATO in Europe. During the speeches by the Russian and American presidents, their by no means similar approaches to resolving the fundamental problem of expanding NATO through the countries of Eastern and Central Europe were revealed. Given the disagreements which took shape at the Budapest forum, a consensus was not reached regarding the adoption of the basic documents. But even before the meeting, the Russian side had postponed signing the agreement on cooperation with NATO.

Departing from the main line of all-European cooperation undoubtedly contradicts the objective interests of Eastern and Western Europe. The path to this cooperation lies through the search for mutual understanding and reasonable compromises. Common sense also suggests that all attempts to draw a new "security boundary" in Europe, wherever they come from, are doomed.

Footnotes

1. SEGODNYA, 27 June 1993.

2. IZVESTIYA, 26 November 1993.

3. S. Karaganov, "NATO's Expansion Leads to Russia's Isolation," MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 19 September 1993.

4. See: IZVESTIYA, 1 January 1994.

5. See: Interview with J. Kirkpatrick, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 January 1994.

6. IZVESTIYA, 5 January 1994.

7. S. Kondrashov, "Military Doctrine in the Political Context," IZVESTIYA, 24 November 1993.

8. NATO REVIEW, Brussels, February 1994, pp 13-16.

9. V. Masterov, "The Vyshegrad Quartet at NATO's Doors," MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, No 2, 1994.

10. L. Korpilov, "Walesa Against Havel," IZVESTIYA, 19 January 1994.

11. NATO REVIEW, Brussels, June 1994, p 6.

12. According to the assertion of the chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, V. Lukin, the agreement on cooperation with NATO cannot be considered a document subject to ratification by parliament, since NATO is not a subject of international law (SEGODNYA, 9 July 1994).

13. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 25 March 1994; PRAVDA, 2 March 1994.

14. V. Chernov, "Moscow Must Ponder Well," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 February 1994.

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15. A. Migranyan, "Why Act if It Is Better Not To?" NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 15 March 1994.

16. THE MOSCOW TRIBUNE, 16 June 1994.

17. E. Balladur, "In Favor of Concluding the Pact on Stability in Europe," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 5 May 1994.

18. NATO REVIEW, Brussels, June 1994, p 30.

NATO Expansion, CFE Revision Said Linked

954Q0199A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 19-20, May 95 [Signed to press 16 May 95] p 40

[Article by Pavel Kandel: "Partnership for 'Cold Peace'—Russia Should Not Be Beaten for Its Weakness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An election campaign in either Russia or the United States is the best time for a verbal competition in defending national interests. The initiative to enlarge NATO eastward provides a very good occasion for such rhetoric.

Something else is evident as well. The more significant an international action, the more dense the "smokescreen" of explanations, interpretations, assurances and denials that accompany it. After all, one has to not only present oneself in a favorable light, but also dispel the apprehensions of others.

Why Not Ex-Yugoslavia?

The White House's main argument for enlarging NATO for "public consumption" is the need to fill the "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe and to extend the "zone of stability" in that conflict-spawning region. But that purpose would be fully served by the Russian proposal for cross security guarantees for the region's countries on the part of NATO and Russia. However, that proposal was rejected. And the geography of the planned enlargement itself calls into the question the sincerity of the explanations offered.

Serious Western analysts admit that the best chance for admission to NATO by no means lies with the countries that have the greatest need for security. When a discussion of NATO expansion gets down to substance, the candidates cited are only the countries of the Visegrad Four (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia). And not even all of them, at that. But NATO is by no means in any hurry to extend its security guarantees to the Balkans, which live under a constant and real threat that the Yugoslav crisis could spill across its current borders. The great powers in NATO have repeatedly stated publicly that they do not wish to involve their ground forces in a resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. Their "stability-promoting" efforts are confined to a readiness to help withdraw the ill-fated UN peacekeepers from Bosnia, thereby giving the combatants the power to "stabilize" the situation on the battlefield until a victorious end.

The European Union and NATO

The Central European politicians who are most persistent in demanding early admission to NATO have a popular rationale: a threat from an unpredictable Russia and its imperial ambitions. In this propaganda work, a book of quotations from Zhirinovskiy and his ilk is an absolutely essential aid. These Russian politicians, in addition to the undying gratitude of Baghdad and Belgrade, may also rightfully claim a reward for their efforts from anti-Russian circles "from Vancouver to Vladivostok." But in reality, the latter, it seems, would be not so much frightened by as pleased with a possible victory by the Russian national-communists. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why each election campaign in Russia is accompanied by Western initiatives that strike a blow to the back of all for whom fundamental anti-Westernism is not the basis of foreign-policy self-determination. The Partnership for Peace program was unveiled on the eve of the 1993 elections. The idea of enlarging NATO eastward appeared at the start of the 1995-1996 election campaign.

Meanwhile, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who can hardly be reproached for pro-Russian sympathies, admits: "Talk of a 'new Yalta' or of a Russian military threat is not substantiated by either actual circumstances or even the worst-case scenarios for the future." But in more intimate conversations, no secret is made of the fact that the danger is seen not in Russia's current unpredictability (which is dangerous only to Russia itself), but in its possible revival. For example, Polish President Lech Walesa told French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur on 1 July 1994: "Unless we join the West in time, the East will swallow us up again."

As time-tables for admission to the European Union are moved back, admission to NATO is becoming the aspirants' only roundabout way to draw closer to the desired goal. And on the contrary, the EU members see the admission of new members from Central and Eastern Europe to NATO, instead of an economically burdensome early admission to their own ranks, as a consolation prize and incentive that maintains hopes for equal integration into a united Europe. One can also discern in this a desire to use external factors of "Europization" to make up for an appreciable shortage of internal sources of that process. At the same time, former Soviet allies very much need the "Russian threat" in order to increase the West Europeans' interest in the

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fate of Central and Eastern Europe. But the fact is that all this has nothing to do with European security.

Balance of Forces

An eastward expansion of NATO objectively strengthens the irreversibility of the Central and East European countries' "departure" from the Soviet (Russian) sphere of influence. Naturally, this cannot gladden Russia, but a restoration of its economic and political positions in the region is beyond its ability for the foreseeable future. For this reason, the admission of the countries of the former "Eastern bloc" into the EU, which would automatically open the door to their joining the Western European Union—the defensive structure of the united Europe—meets no opposition from Russia. However, such a way of attaining European unity evokes no special interest in either Europe or the United States. And so it is necessary to search for other reasons for the drive to expand NATO. [passage missing] if we shift from political and diplomatic rhetoric to an analysis of possible changes in the balance of forces that would arise should NATO expand eastward. Only this approach is realistic when the question is one of enlarging the military bloc. As we know, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty of November 1990) was based on parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pace. Since the dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and then the breakup of the USSR, Russia accounts for approximately 15 percent of all weapons in Europe (compared to 50 percent to 60 percent for the Soviet Union), which in itself gives NATO a significant advantage. If the Central and East European countries are admitted to NATO, this superiority would be double that which the Warsaw Treaty had over NATO in 1990. Western experts saw that inequality of forces as destabilizing in that it offered the potential for large-scale offensive actions.

Consequently, the admission of the Central European countries to NATO would constitute a de jure unilateral violation of the CFE Treaty, and the de facto conclusive destruction of the security system in Europe. A force potential many times greater than the Russian potential would emerge on the continent, one that, moreover, would be in immediate proximity to Russia's borders or directly on its borders (Kaliningrad Oblast). Given the current situation in Europe, this does not mean an actual military threat, but it could mean an intensification of the strategy of containing Russia and putting pressure on its political course. Real levers with which to "maintain geopolitical pluralism," to use Zbigniew Brzezinski's term, would appear on the territory of the former USSR—in other words, for opposing a reintegration of the post-Soviet space.

The initiators of the idea of enlarging NATO do not expect a catastrophic change in the European balance of forces for Russia and its military and political isolation to meet with understanding. For this reason, they have come up with a set of measures to reassure Russia, something that, in and of itself, confirms that the planned enlargement is obviously not to Russia's advantage. Russia is being offered various kinds of treaties with NATO on cooperation and on establishing a mechanism of special security consultations under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the unequal exchange is too obvious: In exchange for consent to a very real upsetting of the balance of forces, nonbinding promises and consultations are offered. No verbal or paper assurances can blur the objective consequences of an expansion of NATO. The CFE Treaty would essentially be voided. Strategic stability in Europe would be drastically undermined. Groups of countries with fundamentally different security guarantees and security levels would appear in the eastern part of the continent, with substantially different degrees of influence on decision-making in the security sphere: the new NATO members, the potential second group of candidates, and the countries deliberately deprived of this prospect. In this system of asymmetrical security, Russia would find itself in the least favorable position.

Reflex

One could, of course, blame Yeltsin: Why, after barely having taken off the irritating "red" clothes, was he in such a hurry to pull on the hide of the Russian bear? One could point out that Western designers also had a hand in this change of clothing. But the essence of the matter lies elsewhere. Moscow is being mercilessly punished for its current weakness, and confronted once more with a tough choice. It would be surprising if the appropriate response proved any less tough.

Russia has lost the power to veto sovereign decisions by other states to join military-political blocs. But it has a no less sovereign right to be concerned about its own security interests, especially when others are unceremoniously ignoring them. And in this context, the character of the existing political regime in Russia or of a political regime that might threaten it in the future is not important. For this is no longer important to Russia's Western "partners," which are planning NATO's expansion without regard for the prospects of Russia's democratic development and are not concerned about them in the least.

Russia's stubborn "no" is the easiest response to the initiative to enlarge NATO, and a purely reflexive one. However, it is a counterproductive response. Its

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refusal to agree could be simply ignored, in the final analysis. But the minimum acceptable condition for Russia's consent to NATO expansion is a maintenance of the balance of forces as the foundation of strategic stability and security in Europe. These two seemingly mutually exclusive approaches can be reconciled if changes in NATO's composition are preceded by the conclusion of a new treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. Such a treaty should stipulate that the admission of each new member to NATO will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the level of the alliance's aggregate level of arms. In addition, such a treaty should guarantee that foreign troops and armaments will not be present on the territories of the Central and East European states, and it should provide a mechanism for constantly monitoring compliance with its provisions. The relevant states of the region would obtain the sought-after chance to obtain the status of NATO members, while Russia would acquire guarantees against a threatening asymmetrical balance of forces and against its de facto exclusion from the European security system. But if no compromise is achieved, "great-NATO" aspirations will result in a manyfold intensification of great Russian sentiments, and then the concept of "European security" will have a place only in the historical archive.

***Belgorod Forum Successes in Finding Foreign Investors Noted**

954E0989A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 3

[Article by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Viktor Metchikov: "Belgorod Entices Foreign Investors: Results of the International Investment Forum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The forum was organized by IZVESTIYA in cooperation with the Russian Finance Corporation and the Belgorod Oblast administration. It undoubtedly became a major event. The participants in it included representatives from 29 foreign firms and trade representations and 33 banks and trade and industrial structures in Russia. Offered for their attention were more than 70 investment projects, as well as business plans and models of finished output from enterprises in Belgorod Oblast and neighboring Kursk Oblast.

First of all, it is necessary to mention the largest investment project, that belongs to the "Yakovlevskiy Rudnik" [Yakovlevskiy Mine] open-type joint-stock company. Today that enterprise is not surrounded by the kind of commotion that always used to accompany similar national-economic construction sites.

In the area of the KMA [Kursk Magnetic Anomaly] ore is extracted today by the open-pit method — from quarries. But the Yakovlevskiy mine has mine shafts. By the moment of publication of the investment project, 74 percent of the capital mine workings had been executed, and the ground structures were in the construction stage. Completion of the operations requires $170 million, but, alas, there is no money. Therefore the people of Belgorod are proposing the creation of a joint venture, and for the creditors they are stipulating the possibility of paying off the loans in the form of providing a part of the volume of the produced output. And two foreign firms have "taken the bait"; negotiations have been carried out with the German Kloeckner firm with regard to the allocation of credit and participation in the ownership of the "Yakovlevskiy Rudnik" AO [joint-stock company]; and another alternative for the granting of credit — by way of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine — has been discussed with the Korean Hundai firm.

The contacts among business people at that forum created the prerequisites for enlivening the commodity exchange between the remote Russian areas and the far and near abroad. In particular, the "Belgorodskiy Zavod Metallokonstruktsiy" AO received a production order from a Chinese firm to manufacture agricultural equipment, and the same Korean Hundai firm issued a production order to the local "Energomash" for delivery of boilers and pipelines. The Czech "Transporta" firm offered the "Stroymaterialy" joint-stock company its commodity — purification filters.

Applied science was also able to show itself. In particular, the Belgorod State Technological Academy of Building Materials established smooth contacts with Chinese, Polish, and Austrian firms. The academy's commodity is scientific developments that are ready for introduction. The forum also opened up new opportunities for Belgorod industry that is processing agricultural output. For example, the "Moloko" AO got three inquiries at the same time: from the "Soyuzpromeksport" All- Russian Trade Association, for investing in a line to produce syrup; from the American Pioneer Investments firm, for the allocation of $1.144 million for a line to produce juices in aseptic packaging; and from the Austrian Schaller firm, for organizing the sale of Belgorod milk in Austria. Potential investors did not disregard such enterprises as the "Belmyaso" and "Belpivo" AO, or the oblast union of consumer cooperatives.

The businessmen's interest in the region's economy is obvious and that interest will undoubtedly be realized, but only if the appropriate conditions exist. The most painful question here, of course, is the guarantees. In order to remove that acuity to a substantial degree, the oblast administration has formed a guarantee fund in the amount of 100 billion rubles. The administration has

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been expressing its readiness to act, when it is a matter of projects of importance for the region, as one of the founders of the enterprises to be created, and, when the interests coincide, to consider proposals concerning the granting of tax benefits in the part to be paid into the oblast budget. It has also been stipulated that, in order to create new and effective production entities, the investors will be assigned plots of land in places with a developed infrastructure.

***Decree, Statute on Duties of Customs, Tariff Commission**

954E0989B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 4

[Decree and statute: "Decree of the Government of the Russian Government, dated 28 April 1995, No. 436, Moscow: Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on Customs and Tariff Questions," and "Statute of the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on Customs and Tariff Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Decree]

For purposes of the further liberalization of foreign-economic ties, the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To form the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on Customs and Tariff Questions (hereinunder the Commission)>

2. To entrust the Commission with the preparation of proposals for the Government of the Russian Federation in the area of tariff measures for regulating the import and export of commodities onto and from the customs territory of the Russian Federation.

3. To confirm Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation O. D. Davydov as Commission chairman.

4. To confirm the appended Statute on the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on Customs and Tariff Questions. Within the period of one month the Commission chairman is to submit proposals concerning the Commission's personnel makeup.

5. To entrust the technical-organizational support of the Commission's work to the RF Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

[Statute]

1. The Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation for Customs and Tariff Questions (hereinunder the Commission) is the coordination agency that carries out the preparation of proposals for the Government of the Russian Federation in the area of tariff measures for regulating the import of commodities onto the customs territory of the Russian Federation and the export of commodities from that territory, with the exception of special types of duties.

2. The Commission in its activities is guided by the RF Constitution, federal laws, edicts and directives of the President of the Russian Federation, edicts and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as this Statute.

3. The Commission's basic tasks are:

— the review and submittal to the Government of the Russian Federation of proposals concerning the establishment and change of the rates of customs duties;

— the analysis of the practice of applying customs tariffs and the preparation of an annual report to the Government of the Russian Federation, entitled "Policy in the Area of Tariff Regulation";

— the review and preparation of proposals concerning the application of measures of tariff regulation with respect to commodities crossing the customs border of the Russian Federation in noncommercial turnover;

-- the review and preparation of proposals for improving customs legislation, and the analysis of the practice of employing that legislation;

— the analysis of the application of measures of customs and tariff regulation in the Russian Federation from positions of their conformity to the norms and rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], and the preparation of the appropriate recommendations;

— the review and preparation of proposals for making amendments and additions to the Commodity Nomenclature of Foreign-Economic Activity.

4. In order to execute the tasks entrusted to it, the Commission has the right:

— to request from the federal agencies of executive authority, state institutions, and organizations materials and information on questions that are within its purview;

— to draw on the services, when necessary and in the established procedure, of experts and consultants to study the questions to be submitted for review by the Commission.

5. The Commission chairman is appointed to the position by the Government of the Russian Federation and bears personal responsibility to it for the resolution of the tasks entrusted to the Commission.

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The Commission members are confirmed by the Government of the Russian Federation on the basis of recommendations by the Commission chairman.

The Commission members take part in the Commission sessions without the right of replacement.

6. The technical-organizational support of the Commission's activities, including the preparation of working documents, is carried out by the RF Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

7. Commission sessions are conducted regularly by the Commission chairman, but at least once a quarter.

A Commission session is considered to be valid if no fewer than two-thirds of its members are present.

8. Commission decisions are made unanimously and are formalized by minutes that are signed by the Commission chairman, or, if necessary, in the form of drafts of decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation to be submitted in the established procedure to the Government of the Russian Federation.

9. The procedure for the Commission's work is defined by its standing orders.

*CIS Countries Working To Develop Unified Criminal Code

954E0989C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 7

[Article by Boris Glebov: "Judging by a Unified Code: The CIS Countries Are Close To Developing the Base Model for a UK [Criminal Code]"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The following comments concerning this problem were made, at the request of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, by Yelena Mizulina, deputy chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Legislation and Judicial and Legal Questions, of the RF Federation Council, doctor of legal sciences, professor, member of the legal committee of the Interparliamentary Assembly of Commonwealth Countries (MPA).**

Its very name — model — contains its basic meaning: this code is recommendatory. As of today, our committee is developing both a model UK, and a model UPK [criminal proceedings code].

The first stipulates types of crimes and types of punishments for them; the second, the procedure of investigations of criminal cases, their hearings, and the procedure for appealing court decisions.

Both codes in the CIS countries can be viewed as some kind of basis or base within the framework of which each of the Commonwealth countries develops its own domestic laws.

An example is the attitude taken in the criminal code to the death penalty: in what instances it is applied and for what categories of criminal cases the death sentence is given. Each Commonwealth country will presumably depart from that base idea.

In particular, while recognizing the very fact of the admissibility of the death penalty, each CIS state determines for itself the specific types of crimes for which the death penalty is given.

Our Constitution stipulates that the death penalty can be given only by a jury. If that model norm were to become part of the appropriate codes in the CIS countries, it would, practically speaking, recommend the creation of a jury in all the Commonwealth countries when reviewing criminal cases for which the death penalty might be given.

At the present time the Committee for CIS Affairs in the Federation Council is engaged in organizing that work and two groups of authors are working on drafts of the model criminal code and the model criminal proceedings code. The makeup of those groups includes scientist-experts from the SF [Federation Council] apparatus and the Russian Administration of State Law. The developers include scientists not only from our country, but also from the Commonwealth countries.

The creation of the model codes is important for all the CIS states, because for a period of many Soviet years all the basic principles of the legislation of the union republics were prepared by the leading legal institutes that were located in Moscow. Most of the CIS countries still do not have any base legal schools with experience in independent law-making.

Recently, in St. Petersburg, there was a discussion of the first version of the texts of the model UK and UPK.

Today we already have a model Civil Code for the CIS (part No. 1). When we were enacting the Russian Civil Code, and it was enacted later than the model Civil Code for the CIS, a report was given by the chairman of the SF Committee on CIS Affairs.

In his statement, two codes were compared: the model code for the CIS and the Russian one. There were discrepancies between them. All the basic principles in both Civil Codes coincide.

In the event of discrepancies between the future model UK and UPK and the existing Russian ones, Russia will definitely be guided by its own ones, inasmuch as our Russian ones are already the law, while the model ones are, in essence, recommendatory acts.

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Of course, if Russia wants the MPA decisions to be recognized by all the Commonwealth countries, then Russia itself, first of all, must observe those recommendations that have been made part of the documents that were enacted by the assembly.

***Update on Publishing of 'Pirated' Books in Russia**

954Q0188A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 May 95 p 16

[Unattributed article: "Book Pirates Encounter Difficulties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The pirate is gradually giving up his position on the Russian book market. Why? We asked Yuriy Maysuradze, an independent expert, to give us his opinion about that.**

Inasmuch as piracy is particularly widespread in the area of translated art literature, as a rule, from the English and French languages, the expert first cited some statistical data regarding translated literature. In 1993 3,132 book titles were translated from English to Russia numbering a total of 245.6 million copies. In 1994 there were 2,527 book titles published numbering 11.4 million copies. That is a sharp decrease in one year.

Some 1,069 book titles were translated from French in 1993 numbering 108 million copies, while in 1994 these figures showed a perceptible decrease: 595 titles and 27.2 million copies. Here is another set of figures by way of illustration: the total number of copies of books published in 1994 by comparison with 1993 decreased by 356 million copies. The reason for that is mainly the sharp rise in the cost of book publishing—an increase in expenditures on paper and printing services.

From this it follows, first of all, that since there is a considerable decrease in the number of published books on the whole, it means that there is a decrease in the number of pirated editions as well (up to now no one has compiled statistics on pirating, which would be rather difficult to do). In addition, it is also necessary to take into account that the attitude of the reading public toward translated literature has changed considerably. In the past, subsisting on starvation rations, the reader would grab almost anything that was available. Now, having appeased himself somewhat, he has become more selective and demands quality.

Here is another important point: the public has become serious about doing away with book pirating. The Association of Authors and Publishers Against Pirating is doing quite a lot in that regard. In addition, the publishers themselves have started issuing regular information indicating the various property rights they have acquired. Some others, it is true, prefer to act in the old way, locking their manuscripts in a safe and remaining silent until publication. Let us also not forget that representative offices of some of the largest world literary agencies have started operating in Russia. One of their duties is to see to it that pirates do not grow in number and also that they are brought to court on legal grounds. On the whole, life has become much more difficult today for the pirates than it was two or three years ago.

***UK Loan To Finance Upgrade of Moscow Phone System**

954Q0188B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 May 95 p 2

[Excerpts from an article by Ya. Shimov: "Moscow Telephone System Upgraded With UK Loan"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I am not certain whether the program of trips to Moscow by John Major ever included visits to new microdistricts in the Russian capital—Butovo, Mitino, or Nikulino. Nevertheless, the British Government allocated $75 million with Russian Government guarantees in special-purpose credit for the development of the telephone network in Moscow.

The British are hoping that the credit will help resolve the problem facing thousands of Moscow residents deprived of such a basic modern convenience as the telephone. [passage omitted]

The credit was received by the joint Russo-British Komstar enterprise, which pledged to transfer 80 percent of the new telephone lines (approximately 300,000) to the jurisdiction of the MGTS [Moscow City Telephone Network] for distribution among those on the waiting list, primarily on the waiting list for special categories of subscribers—war veterans, invalids, families with many children, etc. Together with MGTS, Komstar has already established telephone service at the Nikulino settlement, all of whose residents according to the plan are scheduled to get their telephones at the earliest in 1997-1998. According to the joint program for installation of telephones in Moscow, in four years telephones will be received by several hundred thousand more residents of the new districts in the capital.

Beside Komstar another 27 firms are showing an interest in the Moscow telecommunications market, including foreign firms and joint ventures (AT&T, Sovintel, Telmos, and others). Many of them are interested not

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so much in the creation of new telephone lines as in the modernization of existing ones. According to MGTS data, the majority of telephone exchanges in the capital have become obsolete if not physically then certainly technically. The most modest estimates, however, indicate that several billion dollars will be required in order to re-equip the entire telephone network of Moscow. [passage omitted]

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Political Issues

*Consequences of Yeltsin's Attempts To Create Two Centrist Blocs

954F2357B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 95 p 9

[Article by Andranik Migranyan, editor in chief of MOYA GAZETA: "Attempts To Create a Centrist Bloc in the Absence of a Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From every indication, the people who proposed the idea of creating a broad stable center in the future Duma on the basis of left-centrist and right-centrist blocs under the leadership of Chernomyrdin and Rybkin to the president either were simply ignorant of the political process in Russia or were pursuing their own selfish interest. Every schoolchild knows that Russia is not America. Specialists know that it took Western Europe until the 1970s and 1980s, and the experience of agonizing cataclysms and upheavals, to arrive at a bipolar electorate that is oriented toward the center and a U.S.-type two-party system or coalition of two-party blocs. The blindness of the people behind the idea of creating an American party system under present Russian conditions can only be explained in the words of the Russian premier, words, to be sure, which were spoken with regard to a different matter: "We wanted the best, but we got the usual." In the immediate aftermath of the formation of the Chernomyrdin bloc on 12 May, I shall dwell only on a few of what, in my view, are the most important aspects of the existing pre-election situation.

First of all, the idea of creating two centrist blocs has collapsed, at least for now. On the eve of the creation of the right-centrist bloc, Mikhail Lapshin, leader of the Agrarian Party, categorically stated that the agrarians would not join any bloc. Thus a gaping hole formed in the left-center, a hole which can scarcely be covered by a few symbolic parties and movements within Moscow's Sadovyy Ring—parties and movements which were supposed to play the role of decoration surrounding the left-centrist bloc's agrarian trunk.

Second, such a development of events may result in the fact that instead of a consolidation of the center, we get even greater fragmentation, whereby the president and government will rely only on Chernomyrdin's "party of bosses." Thus, instead of forcing the radicals' political forces to the edge of the political spectrum, the government party itself will become one of many forces in the parliament and, quite possibly, not the largest and not the most influential. The experience of 1993 indicates that Gaydar and his friends from the government and president's administrative staff managed to achieve extremely modest results in Duma elections under far more favorable conditions.

Third, attempts to create these blocs with the president's blessing may cause serious damage to the president himself. The failure of attempts to create a left center and the focusing of the crossfire of criticism from both the left and right on the Chernomyrdin bloc will hardly be limited only to the figure of the premier and will hardly fail to become an additional irritant for harsher criticism directed at the president himself. I have previously written and still believe that the president had a unique opportunity to distance himself from the Duma elections in order to enter the presidential election with minimum losses should he decide to participate in it.

Fourth, I think it is extremely risky for both the premier and the president to be leading the premier's bloc into elections that will, for all intents and purposes, turn into a vote of confidence in the government and, to a considerable extent, in the president, on the part of the people. Of course, the premier and government can be replaced if the election outcome is unfavorable for the Chernomyrdin bloc, but the distance to the presidential election is too short for a serious shakeup of the government and its policy course.

Fifth, I recently noted in the press (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 April) that President Yeltsin was in an extremely advantageous position, since in current Russian politics he was virtually playing with two teams. In the event that the Chernomyrdin-Chubays team fails, he has in reserve the team of Soskovets and a number of key figures from his entourage who are prepared to adopt both an alternative ideology and an alternative policy course while preserving the continuity of the president's politics. Lumping together Chubays and Soskovets in the context of Chernomyrdin's right-centrist bloc will drastically limit the president's freedom to maneuver should another government crisis arise. Also, if you consider that the Rybkin bloc has very little chance of becoming viable, in that case both society and political circles will seek alternatives to the Chernomyrdin bloc outside present governmental structures and politicians associated with the Yeltsin Administration.

In conclusion, it can boldly be stated that even a cursory analysis makes obvious the fact that attempts to create a broad center on the basis of the Chernomyrdin and Rybkin blocs are more likely to create new and very serious problems for the president and those presently in authority than they are to help solve existing problems.

I would like to hope that the president, in refusing not only to attend but even to send greetings to the founding forum of the Chernomyrdin bloc, intuitively recognized what shaky ground he was being pushed

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onto and decided to radically distance himself from this extremely dubious undertaking.

***Duma Legislation Committee Chairman Interviewed**

954F2264A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 May 95 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Legislation and Judicial-Legal Reform, by observer Oleg Zhirnov; place and date not given: "The Legislator on the Deck of a Sinking Ship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zhirnov] Vladimir Borisovich, please introduce your committee to MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA readers.

[Isakov] The Committee on Legislation is one of the hardest-working committees in the State Duma. It has jurisdiction over four large areas and, correspondingly, there are four subcommittees. The first is constitutional legislation: amendments to the Constitution and constitutional laws. The second is the subcommittee on human rights and federal legislation. It is working on the law on Human Rights Authority and the Civil Code. The third subcommittee is for electoral legislation: It is now busy with the law on referendum and on the formation of the Federation Council. And then there is the subcommittee on judicial-legal reform—the most difficult part of our work: A colossal number of draft laws pass through it: on the judicial system, the criminal code, the law on the status of judges, etc. Since we have a large number of professional jurists, we are given many current instructions like preparing appeals to the constitutional court, etc. I will not pass up a chance to complain: The Duma has an equalizing system: Although our work load is several times greater than that of other committees, we have the same number of apparatus workers.

[Zhirnov] In general where do the draft laws in the Duma come from? Who is the most "fruitful" in this business?

[Isakov] In terms of the basic and largest draft laws, the main source is the president. Approximately one-third of the draft laws are introduced by deputies. But through them they come from interested organizations. Draft laws are also introduced by agents of legislative initiative from the regions and judicial organs.

[Zhirnov] Is the adoption of a block of electoral laws a priority in the work of both your committee and the State Duma as a whole? There is the opinion that the main thing for the lower chamber should be, for example, economic legislation....

[Isakov] The priority ranking of electoral laws was determined by the Duma itself and it is still in power. It has repeatedly been confirmed at sessions of the Duma Council as well. Any attempt to change these priorities would not be in society's interests. If the Federal Assembly cannot adopt electoral laws—it simply discredits and disgraces itself in the eyes of society.

[Zhirnov] But, as we know, the Federation Council rejected the laws that were about to be adopted by the Duma concerning elections of deputies to the lower chamber and on presidential elections. What is the situation with these key laws now?

[Isakov] It became clear to us that the Federation Council had taken a course toward dragging out the adoption of these laws. There had been two sessions of the conciliation commission and it had not had a quorum at either of them. There was also the letter from Vl. Shumeyko in which he stated that the Federation Council had not yet made a decision regarding this issue. We could not allow the adoption of such extremely important laws to be interrupted. Therefore we made a proposal to consider the question at a plenary session of the State Duma and vote for all the proposals that had come from deputies of the Federation Council. The State Duma agreed to a number of them. It reduced the number of signatures required for registration as a candidate for the presidency from 1.5 million to 1 million. With others—particularly the one on changing the proportions of elections of deputies according to territorial and party districts—it did not agree.

As a result, both draft laws were adopted in the new redaction in which—and this must be emphasized once again—many proposals of Federation Council deputies were taken into account. Now the laws have been sent to the upper chamber.

If the Federation Council approves what we have adopted, I think that after 10 May you will not recognize Russia. Its political life will be in full swing since it will be clear that legally the door to the elections has been opened. The election campaign, consultations, negotiations, and the formation of political blocks, which have been relatively sluggish up to this point, will proceed with greater intensiveness. The problem is to get these laws passed. This is an aspect of utmost importance. If the law on the referendum is delayed, nothing terrible will happen; the same is true of the law on the constitutional assembly. But these two laws are holding up all political life in the country.

[Zhirnov] But why are you neglecting the sphere of the Constitution so? As I understand it, the constitutional assembly is a kind of spare, "insurance version" for society....

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[Isakov] To a certain extent—yes. And I do not rule out the possibility that this "insurance version" will be needed; we will need a fundamental revision of the constitutional principles. We are now seeing more and more "holes" in the Constitution. The hastiness of its adoption is beginning to show. The Constitutional Court is bogged down with questions of interpretation of this Constitution. I already have a special file crammed full of these interpretations since actually they are appendices to the Constitution regarding individual issues. From the standpoint of strategy, all this may be necessary. But we are speaking about the current step in the political process. It must be taken efficiently, in the form of a law. Then we can think about the second step and the third. But anyone who takes both steps at the same time is sure to fall.

[Zhirnov] Incidentally, about steps and the danger of "falling." The State Duma has adopted a law on the formation of the Federation Council. According to it, the upper chamber is to be formed through election. Will you not fall into the same trap? For now the Federation Council will approve it, but then there will be an appeal to the constitutional court—taking into account the fact that there were disputes on the interpretation of the very concept of its "formation." Then in the final stage, before the elections—everything will fall apart.

[Isakov] In the commentary to the Constitution, which was drawn up by the most eminent legal experts in the country and published in 1994, in particular, it says: "In principle it shall also be possible for members of the Federation Council to be elected by voters residing on the territory of the corresponding component of the Federation from among candidates nominated by executive and representative organs of state power." This is the version we have embodied in the law. I assume that when the constitutional court considers this issue—and I do not rule out the possibility that it will be considered—it will come to the same conclusion: The concept of "formation" includes also "election."

[Zhirnov] But in general is purely legislative activity crucial now? During perestroyka times there was a kind of motto: "Let us create a rule-of-law state—let us solve all the problems." But now—under the conditions of the rapid development of a crisis in the country?

[Isakov] There is a somewhat cynical saying to the effect that when a ship is sinking, any deliberate activity on board, right down to marching on the deck, is useful since it distracts attention from the panic....

[Zhirnov] Is it this "marching on the deck" that both the Duma and deputies are engaged in now...?

[Isakov] Well that, of course, is a joke. But if one is to speak about the essence, I think that any emergence from the crisis must rely on calm and well-considered decisions. And not only on political but also legislative mechanisms. But be that as it may, we have been able to create something today. We have made progress in the formation of a judicial system. We have adopted a number of constitutional laws. Although feebly, from my viewpoint, the constitutional court has begun to work. We have adopted a law on the Constitutional Arbitration Court. I hope that we will soon adopt a law on the Authority on Human Rights and Electoral Legislation. In a word, certain support points are being created for a turn toward a genuinely civilized and humanistic society.

[Zhirnov] The direction of legal construction is again determined by the Constitution. Does this mean that you are satisfied with the currently existing constitutional system of relationships between the authorities and the adoption of decisions? After all, in the Duma many are in favor of changing the Constitution....

[Isakov] I would say that the question itself is posed incorrectly—without clarifying where this system came from. It is clear that it did not arise all at once, it was formed over a fairly long period of time. There have been many chances and opportunities for a normal resolution to those same issues of privatization, property, economic development, and social life—and they have been passed up. Either these problems will be carried through into the future, and they will be aggravated—and then they will break through to the surface in a worse and explosive version. People's patience will come to an end and they will begin to resolve them themselves—through nonparliamentary means. Or certain new forces will come to power—and this will give us a chance to resolve the problems through legal means.

[Zhirnov] The "new force" calls itself mainly the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]....

[Isakov] I think that work in the parliament has shown that Zhirinovskiy's party is absolutely fruitless on the constructive plane and it does not resolve problems. But somehow I am not upset about the possibility of his coming to power. If we are doomed to make this mistake and we have to learn from it again—well then, let the mistake be made. But here we must see that the roots of this mistake lie in the current authorities. This authority has neglected people to such a degree that they see no way out other than through degradation of power. I do not think that this possibility is a reason for rejecting democratic institutions in general. But since we have entered on the path of democracy, we shall probably

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have to proceed along this path, including through eating the bitter fruits it is producing. Otherwise it will turn out that each authority that comes to power will be "the wisest," the only one and the unique one, to which there is no alternative.

Ultimately at some point the people will have to rule and the people themselves will have to choose the kind of power they need. If they elect Zhirinovskiy—what can you say—so be it. Let them live with that kind of authority. And let them reap its fruits.

[Zhirnov] But that is the future. Let us return to the present day. How does what is going on in Chechnya now look from the standpoint of laws and legislation?

[Isakov] From a legal standpoint Chechnya is an unsanctioned application of force. To put it simply, it is arbitrariness of power. And to put it crudely, it is gangsterism of power. The solution to political problems by illegal, gangster methods—that is what "Chechnya" is.

[Zhirnov] Then the question: Did the parliament take advantage of all legislative possibilities of placing a barrier on this path?

[Isakov] As for the parliament, it has shown that this gripping, tragic subject immediately began to be used in parliament by certain circles in a purely populist way. They saw in it a chance to make points, to regain their popularity, and to return to the center of public attention, to show themselves as "defenders of the law," to take the lead among the masses again, etc. It is clear that appeals to halt the military activities are pointless because even if one side—I have in mind the federal troops—obeys these appeals and if they are formalized in a law, the other side will not obey anything! Under the conditions that have developed, to halt the military activities would mean to leave the problem in the form in which it now exists and to encounter it again in a month or a year. It must be resolved. But, of course, not in such a disgracefully barbaric way as we have started to solve it now.

In this case it has also been shown that nobody takes the parliament seriously. Nobody is interested in its position. And nobody pays any attention to the law. There are laws about martial law and a state of emergency. But they have not been used. They have not become the subject of consideration. The parliament is actually powerless here.

The only thing it can do is try somehow to reach the shore, within the framework of the application of force, having adopted a new law on this. We have reached this stage. Such a law was adopted recently. But the degree to which it will solve the problem is difficult to say since, I repeat, we have a tradition of a scornful attitude toward laws from top to bottom.

[Zhirnov] So perhaps it would help for the chambers of parliament to appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the war in Chechnya.

[Isakov] The Federation Council has applied to the constitutional court—in connection with the president's secret edict. In my opinion, the State Duma could also appeal—at least in connection with the government actions in Chechnya.

From the very beginning I have said that the initiator here is the president and not the government. To make an appeal regarding the actions of the government is to wittingly proceed toward a loss. They will show you the president's edict on the basis of which the government decree was published and say that everything is constitutional. And, to be honest, I cannot yet imagine the possibilities of the constitutional court in the Chechnya problem: What effect would its intervention have?

Most likely the consideration of the question there would be regarding the results of accomplished facts. That is, the government and the president would solve the problem as disgracefully, forcefully, and illegally as they could and then the constitutional court would say: "Well, you see, this happened although there were certain violations...."

Nobody would have any feelings one way or the other about that. You cannot resurrect any of those who were killed or maimed there. That is, the president and the government would complete their slaughter in Chechnya and then figure out how to deal with us, the legal experts, and "after the fact," when the law is powerless to help the people. The president will give out awards and we will give out legal assessments.

Of course this is a tragedy. Not only for Chechnya but for all of Russia. It demonstrates the powerlessness of its law and its democratic institutions. But this is reality, and it is necessary to deal with it only in order to somehow change it....

***Public Opinion Poll on Results of Perestroyka**

954E0979A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 13 May 95 p 12

[Article by Vilen Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "A Decade of Perestroyka. Result Disquieting (Muscovites' Views)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **At the end of March, a group of scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Social Political Studies (V. Ivanov, leader; I. Ladodo, A. Kotov, and A. Kozina,**

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executors) conducted a new survey of Muscovites on the subject of a decade of the perestroyka declared by M. Gorbachev.

It was suggested that respondents (650 people participated in the survey) evaluate its results based on such basic orientations as: rehabilitation of the economy, democratization of the country, rise in the nation's material standard of living, and consolidation of the country's positions in the international arena.

As the data demonstrates, people evaluate the results of the past decade in various ways. This is how it looks in a table, if one takes into consideration the fact that in general, nearly every 10th person was unable to determine the character of the changes that occurred over those years.

What results have been achieved? (in percentage of total number surveyed)

	Economic rehabilitation	Democratization of the country	Rise in material standard of living	Consolidation of positions in international arena
significant success achieved	2	9	3	7
insignificant success achieved	14	25	14	18
no success	27	29	19	18
situation has worsened	47	26	55	27

As is evident from the data, it is the changes that have occurred in the country's style of leadership, to the degree that civil freedoms and human rights are assured, that are most highly valued in the mass consciousness. Successes (significant or insignificant) in this area were noted by 9 and 25 percent, respectively, of the total number surveyed.

Here, nearly a third (29 percent) suggest that there have been no successes at all in the country's democratization, and none in the provision of human rights, while slightly fewer (26 percent) attest that the situation in this area has only worsened over the last decade.

One-fourth of those surveyed are sure that certain successes were achieved over this period in consolidating Russia's positions in the international arena, but nearly the same number (27 percent) state the opposite, that the situation has gotten worse, and 18 percent feel that there has been no success whatsoever here.

In the opinion of those surveyed, there has been less noticeable positive progress made toward rehabilitating the economy and raising the nation's material standard of living than in any other area. Those who feel that significant or insignificant success was achieved here are 2 and 14 percent, respectively. The rest either didn't notice any success at all in this area or are firmly convinced that the situation has only gotten worse.

As far as their personal life is concerned, over half (51 percent) noted that there had been changes for the worse.

A comparison of evaluations of changes that occurred over the period under study in respondents' standards of living allows us to suggest that the main burdens of perestroyka have been placed on the shoulders of the older generation, while respondents under 30 years of age feel better concerning this issue.

	under 30	30-50	over 50
now live:			
much better	12	6	1
somewhat better	30	21	8
the same	32	23	17
slightly worse	14	20	21
significantly worse	9	29	49
can't say	3	2	4

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Among those under 30, barely half (42 percent) are now living better, while in the group of those over 50, only 9 percent were. In these age groups, 23 and 70 percent, respectively, now live worse. Regarding people in the productive age groups—30-50—nearly half (40 percent) of them noted that their lives had gotten worse.

The opinions of those surveyed were divided on their evaluation of the necessity of perestroyka: 40 percent feel that it was worth beginning, the same number state the opposite, while the remaining simply have not yet been convinced one way or the other. Here, it should be said that many of those who stated that perestroyka was necessary felt the need to qualify their answers: perestroyka was necessary, but through these methods.

Of the total surveyed, 60 percent give a negative answer to the question: "Is Russia's current government capable of improving the situation in Russia?" Another 19 percent can't say, and 6 and 15 percent, respectively, feet that the government is "basically" or "partially" capable of improving the situation.

The group of readers under 30, in which the share of those who are "successful," who have "acclimatized" to the current situation is greater than in the older age group, attest to the current government's ability to correct the state of affairs—29 percent of the respondents, compared with 18 percent who share the same point of view in the older age groups.

The events in Chechnya are the main sore point in the country today. A total of 81 percent, 90 percent, and 91 percent of the respondents in the "under 30," "30-50," and "over 50" age groups, respectively, follow the events.

The degree of certainty that the measures taken by federal authorities to resolve the Chechen crisis are adequate is also higher in the "under 30" age group than in the group of respondents "over 50;" they feel that the federal authorities are capable of resolving this private situation as well. In the comparable groups, it is 22 and 14 percent of those surveyed.

The respondents' evaluations of the results of perestroyka speak of the degree of loyalty to the government in general and toward individual undertakings, specifically.

As the survey results of these evaluations have shown, it is also possible to a significant extent to judge the attitude toward the coming Federal Assembly elections, which will determine the character of the future government.

The survey data allows us to confirm that the character of the changes over the course of the 10-year period of reforms decreases the respondents' level of political activity—in this case, their degree of active participation in the elections.

Participation in past and future elections (in percentage of number surveyed in groups)

	Total	Under 30	30-50	Over 50
1993 Federal Assembly elections				
—took part	66	44	63	80
—didn't take part	34	65	37	20
Will participate in Federal Assembly elections				
—yes	48	44	43	55
—no	19	23	21	15
—undecided	33	34	36	30
Will you vote for the same people?				
—yes	12	11	11	13
—no	37	24	36	44
—can't say	21	15	19	25

As we can see from the data, the share of those who have already decided to take part in the coming elections has dropped in comparison with the share of those who participated in the 1993 elections from 66 to 48 percent

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of those surveyed. There is an especially noticeable decrease—from 63 to 43 percent, and from 80 to 55 percent—in the older age groups. It is exactly these groups, due to peculiarities of the age structure of Moscow, the specific nature of their political behavior (in other words, the fact that the habit of participating in elections was instilled in them for years), their greater politicization (59 percent of the respondents in the over-50 age group and 32 percent in the under-30 age group follow mass media appearances dedicated to the elections; 40 percent and 34 percent in the age groups being compared named parties that enjoy their trust), that comprise the basic electorate of Moscow.

The results over the past decade have also led to a reexamination of former political authorities: only 12 percent of the respondents who have decided to take part in the elections will vote for their idols. The level of withholding confidence from them is much higher in the older age groups. So, according to the survey data, 24 percent of the respondents in the under-30 group, 36 percent in the 30-50 group, and 44 percent, or close to half of the group of those surveyed over 50 will not be voting for the people they voted for in the 1993 elections.

When indicating their political preferences, when naming the parties that enjoy their trust, the majority give their preferences to political parties of a democratic bent. Here, 42 percent of those surveyed stated that they do not trust a single political party; the order of preference is determined in the following manner: "YABLoko"—15 percent, "Russia's Choice"—9 percent, Communist Party of Russia—5 percent, the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]—2 percent, and about 1 percent of the total of those surveyed were national patriots. Another 10 percent of those surveyed named other parties, including B. Fedorov's party, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

Of course, the attitude toward perestroyka has not yet formed completely. It will take time. "Large things are visible at a distance," and perestroyka, with all of its complexity and contradiction, with all of its drama and extraordinarily high price and its difficult consequences, is a historically large and important matter. There is no doubt that during the preparations for the coming elections, interest in perestroyka, its "architects" and "superintendents," its opponents and adversaries will grow, and the ideas and plans that it has given rise to will, one way or another, be put to use by the various political forces.

*'Women of Russia' Not To Join Chernomyrdin, Rybkin Blocs

954E0989D Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 May 95 p 2

[Interview with Ye. Lakhova, by Tatyana Sukhomlinova, under rubric "Democracy in Russia: Reality and Forecasts": "Women's Voices in the Party Chorus: They can sound independently. That is the opinion of Yekaterina Lakhova, leader of the 'Women of Russia' parliamentary faction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sukhomlinova] Yekaterina Filippovna, at the present time various political figures have been appealing with increasing frequency to the democratically minded voters, counting on their votes. Does "Women of Russia" also hope for their support?

[Lakhova] What do you mean by "democratically minded voter"? Both Zyuganov and Gaydar consider themselves to be democrats. Can you say whose voters are more or less democratically minded? At the present time it is very complicated to determine which voter can be unambiguously called a democratically minded one. As for the supporters of the "Women of Russia" political movement, both the computations and simply the everyday observations indicate that our electorate is the most stable one.

[Sukhomlinova] But how does "Women of Russia" understand the term "democratic"?

[Lakhova] In my opinion, it will be necessary to talk about democracy when laws are operating in our country, when human rights are not only declared by the Basic Law [Constitution], but also implemented in practice, when, in society, there are no obstacles to the creation and formation of various sociopolitical structures.

[Sukhomlinova] What is your attitude toward the recommendations to hold an election to the State Duma only on the basis of single-mandate districts?

[Lakhova] I am convinced that if such an alternative were to occur currently, we would get an uncontrollable parliament. Even if the "single-mandators" were nominated only from the parties. Upon arriving in the parliament, they will not be able to form a team that is of equal value to the one that is created as a result of an election on the basis of party lists. In the example of the present makeup of the lower house of parliament, one can already speak about the greater productivity of its work on a multiparty basis.

Without a doubt, it is possible to discuss whether or not we are pleased with the current level of the political sophistication of the parliamentarians, with the present

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level of the political game and ethics. But nevertheless that sophistication has begun to develop. Without it, the growth of pariamentarianism in Russia is inconceivable.

Possibly in the future, when we have not 70 parties, but only three or five, the election of candidates from them on the basis of single-mandate districts will prove to be justified. But currently... We must acquire at least some kind of experience in holding parliamentary elections on a multiparty basis, and must interpret that experience, rather than dash around from side to side only because the results of today's polls have caused some people to be panicked that, all of a sudden, Zhirinovsky will prove to have more votes... To prevent that from happening, it is necessary simply to work for the benefit of the voter, rather than for self-advertising.

[Sukhomlinova] Do you have anyone specific in mind?

[Lakhova] First of all, those who call themselves democrats. Boris Fedorov, for example, was present at the beginning of those reforms, but now he criticizes everyone and everything mercilessly.

I would like it if the voters very sensibly and soberly approached the election and understood that neither a parliamentary nor a presidential election will improve the situation in society until the contradictions between the President and the legislative and executive authorities, which contradictions have been made part of the existing Constitution, have been eliminated. But, unfortunately, many people hope that if they elect a certain person today, then tomorrow he will improve their life, because, after all, that is what he is promising us...

[Sukhomlinova] How do you evaluate the creation of blocs headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin and Ivan Rybkin? Do you plan to unite with one of them?

[Lakhova] The "Women of Russia" movement is centrist in nature. And this is confirmed by the activity of our parliamentary faction. We have a political niche. We are not hindering anyone. We shall go to the election independently. Because it is clear that if we annex ourselves to one of those blocs, we will get lost in the lists. That decision was made without any differences of opinion by the council of our political movement, at which an analysis was made of the various prospects for participating in the forthcoming campaign.

We are not planning to work against any bloc or party. But there is also no need to unite with them. We are working on our own movement... As for Rybkin's bloc, it does not yet exist.

[Sukhomlinova] What results does "Women of Russia" count on in the parliamentary election?

[Lakhova] We count on being able to overcome the five-percent barrier. That is unambiguous. We hope to increase our representation in the future Duma also in the single-mandate districts. More precise computations are something for the future. But at the present time it is already clear that things will be complicated for us financially. Because all the holders of major financial funds will be divided among the largest blocs. But I think that not everything can be bought, and I am hoping on the voters' intelligence.

[Sukhomlinova] From what parties or movements have you already received offers to combine forces in the election struggle?

[Lakhova] I would not yet want to mention anyone specifically. The discussion of possible alternatives is being carried out, as the expression goes, in the lobby. But here is one interesting detail: everyone who has made proposals to us feels that they do not have to unite with us, but we have to unite with them. But we feel that the "Women of Russia" movement should go to the election with its own list. Women's representation in parliament is very important.

In general, people in the parties remember women on the eve of an election. On the eve of the most recent parliamentary election, the council of the "Women of Russia" political movement sent inquiries to all the parties that were registered at that time. We wanted to know what their attitude was to women's problems, to their role in sociopolitical life. We received only three replies, and even those used the most general expressions that meant absolutely nothing. The feeling was, "When we get into power, we'll take a look, and maybe we will also engage in your problems then." It was then that we decided to go to the election independently, with our own list. And we acted correctly. Certain women's organizations made another choice. "Women's Forum," for example, joined "YaBLoko" [Apple]. But none of their female candidates showed up in the Duma, since Grigoriy Yavlinskiy gave them a place that was definitely not at the beginning of the list.

I am afraid that, this time, the situation may be repeated. Therefore I feel that women's movements must get stronger within the parties. Then, possibly, there will no longer be a necessity for our movement to go to the election in a separate list. But currently for us this is the only true alternative for getting closer to the execution of the tasks that were listed in the charter of the "Women of Russia" political movement. Those tasks include the raising of the status of woman in public life; the promotion of woman to the level of making state decisions; and concern for the upcoming generation.

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We feel that the optimal level of women's representation in parliament is 30-40 percent. Of course, that level can be achieved not only at the expense of our movement. And, naturally, we shall support those parties and blocs that include women in their lists of candidates.

***RNA's Romanov Discusses Economic Policy**

954Q0200A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 27 May 95 p 2

[Interview with Petr Romanov, general director of the production association Krasnoyarsk Chemical Combine "Yenisey," conducted by DELOVOY MIR correspondent: "If I Were To Become President of Russia: We Will Create a Russian Society of Social Equity!"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Begin boxed material]

From the files of DELOVOY MIR:

Our guest today is Petr Vasilyevich Romanov, general director of the production association Krasnoyarsk Chemical Combine "Yenisey," Hero of Socialist Labor, doctor of technical sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Engineering Sciences, and member of the country's parliament, the Federation Council.

He was born in 1943 in the city of Kansk. His father was a railroad engineer and a political prisoner at Kraslag. His family lived Reshota, where Petr Vasilyevich Romanov finished school, and as an upperclassman acquired the specialties of steam engine turbine winder, metalworker and driver. In 1967, he completed the Siberian Technological Institute.

He has worked at the "Yenisey" combine since 1967, travelling the path from worker to general director of the enterprise.

He heads the organizational committee of the All Russian Congress of Russian Communes, is the co-chairman of the Russian National Assembly and one of the leaders of the "Accord in the Name of Russia" movement.

Petr Vasilyevich and Valentina Alekseyevna Romanov have two sons and a daughter. The head of the family is an avid collector. He has an impressive collection of ancient icons, and is an expert on paintings. He is particularly fond of landscapes, giving preference to the Krasnoyarsk school.

He has officially announced his intention to declare his candidacy in the country's presidential elections in 1996.

[End boxed material]

[Correspondent] This year marks 10 years since the beginning of the "perestroyka" proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev. How do you evaluate its course and results, Petr Vasilyevich? And in general, do you believe that present-day Russia is on the right course?

[Romanov] The intentions of the Gorbachev command to radically alter the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and the Soviet state were not unexpected to me. About 2 or 3 years before that, I and some of my colleagues from the corps of directors came to conclusion regarding the need for a new economic state doctrine. I became convinced of this by the notable decline in the rates of development of the national economy and the drop in labor productivity, specifically at enterprises of the VPK [military-industrial complex], which, in my opinion, was cuased by a significant slowdown in scientific-technical progress in the national economy.

I will not go into an in-depth analysis of the specific errors allowed in the course of the clearly unsuccessful, half-hearted and inconsistent Gorbachev perestroyka, as well as during the transition to a market economy, toward which President B. Yeltsin and his friends the radical democrats have dragged Russia. I am convinced that the primary miscalculation allowed by our bold reformers consists of the incorrect choice of methods for implementing the planned transformations. In this century, Russia has been sorely tried by revolutionary steps. In 1905, and in 1917, and in August of 1991, and again in October of 1993. This brought nothing good to the country. And therefore, I believe, the evolutionary path of development is preferable for it.

While justly condemning forced farm collectivization, the fathers of the current economic reform have themselves embarked upon the tactic of "five—into four," "you give—a decisive storm," and so forth. It is specifically for this reason that Russia finds itself today in a deep economic crisis, bordering on catastrophe, while most Russian citizens are living below the poverty level.

[Correspondent] In undertaking this reform, Acting Premier Yegor Gaydar promised us a short-term shock from liberalization of prices, and a quick changeover to stabilization of production of denationalized industrial enterprises. As you may recall, the president seconded him in this. In your opinion, did they really believe in the possibility of such a blitz-reform?

[Romanov] As for the president, I am afraid that he, not having sufficient knowledge in the sphere of the market economy, was simply susceptible to persuasion by the leaders of the government at that time, exhibiting the bravery of ignorance. He wanted very much to gain fame as a brave ruler, to bestow upon Russia's citizens a

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happy and satisfied life in 2 or 3 year's time. And to take his place among the ranks of the great domestic state leaders—somewhere next to Peter I. Well, but Yegor Gaydar and his command should have understood what a stew they were cooking up. Yet they knew that they would not have another chance to secure themselves in power. And so, they had to go all out.

One of the main tasks of market reform is considered to be the denationalization of property. There is a deep sense in this. State enterprises solve the problem of providing the country and its population with the necessary products and goods. Here, no attention is paid to expenditures. That is how it was in Soviet times. Our sorry excuses for reformers decided that overall privatization would make it possible to create conditions for the effective operation of each enterprise and the economy as a whole.

And so they decided to implement this most complex operation at a shock tempo, by means of giving each Russian citizen property through issuance of vouchers. Thus, they said, in a year or two it would be possible to create a class of owners. (Parenthetically, I will note that this entire race was undertaken by the government so as to, among other things, distract the population from the onset of its poverty, caused by the fantastic inflation resulting from liberalization of prices). Yet it is clear to everyone: It is impossible to effectively implement privatization in such a huge country as Russia in such a short time. Not to mention the fact that it must be implemented selectively and in a well-planned manner. Moreover, there cannot be a fair noncompensatory division of property—there is no precise criterion for it. The main thing is that it is impossible to change the psychology of a person literally overnight, to make him a true owner-proprietor.

Privatization did not resolve any of the problems facing it. They wanted to create a broad strata of owners, but they got millions of small-scale stockholders, who themselves had to be protected from the whims of the "sharks of capital" such as Mavrodi. They expected that in the process of privatization there would be a structural reorganization of the economy, that an upswing of production would begin. Yet in real life everything appears quite differently: The decline encompassed all sectors of the economy, and many enterprises found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. The vouchers which had been issued intensified the rates of inflation.

[Correspondent] As it turns out, voucher privatization did not bring benefit to anyone?

[Romanov] Well, no. Why do you say that? For some this operation proved quite favorable. I am referring to the dealers who bought up the vouchers for a pittance, allowing them to acquire privatized plants and factories at a cheap price. Many of them have no intention of increasing goods production, are giving their facilities for lease, or simply selling them off to foreigners. There are many examples where, with the aid of bribed state officials, members of the old party apparatus, representatives of the new Russian democracy, became the owners of sizeable enterprises.

[Correspondent] Where is the solution? There have even been some appeals to turn back, to return to a socialist economy.

[Romanov] In other words, to paraphrase the well-known expression, in order to de-privatize the economy it is necessary to decisively nationalize everything? I categorically disagree with such proposals. Because I do not want civil war over a new division of property. I believe we should analyze the mistakes which have been allowed and try to correct them during the second stage of privatization—the stage of unrestricted sale of shares in enterprises which have already been denationalized. But the main thing is to help those positive processes which in themselves, regardless of the will of the authorities, are becoming ever more clearly manifested in our life.

[Correspondent] Recently, speaking at a meeting of government, Minister of Finance V. Panskov announced that the decline of production in the country for the first quarter of this year comprised around 5 percent. When you speak of positive processes in our economy, are you referring to specifically such facts?

[Romanov] I have not heard about them. However, I do know the real state of affairs in industry. In our combine, the decline in production in the first quarter reached almost 20 percent. I often had occasion to meet with directors of other enterprises. They cite similar figures. I believe that on the whole the level of decline in production throughout Russia is at least three times greater than that cited by the minister.

Then again, any figure may be skillfully manipulated, and a statistical plate may be served up with a "tasty garnish." We may, of course, affirm that the decline in production in the current year is less than a year ago. There is no argument here. In 1994 there was room for decline—the production volume was still considerable. Yet in the current year it is more modest. And if we do not stop the decline in production, soon it will come to a standstill altogether. Then we may triumphantly report: The decline in the economy is equal to zero. But should we wait for this?

[Correspondent] Many consider one of the obstacles in the path of stabilization and development of production

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to be the lack of development of our system of taxation. Leading scientists maintain that a reduction of its level would evoke a revitalization in the country's economic situation. Do you share such views, Petr Vasilyevich?

[Romanov] There is perhaps no more current, and at the same time worn out, topic than the discussion of the existing system of taxation and the proposed changes to it. As the general director of a large association, I can testify—taxes really are high. From each ruble of profit we have to give the treasury no less than 90 kopeks. These collections should be reduced. Yet as a member of the Federation Council, I understand that to reduce taxes, to give various benefits, is dangerous: The budget is creaking, there is a catastrophic shortage of funds for the most necessary expenditures.

A well-regulated tax system is the sign of a strong state. Russia, alas, cannot be considered one today. Therefore, our tax system operates so-so. Its crisis reflects the crisis of all institutions of power.

Taxes in Russia are not being paid because it is unprofitable to pay them, and because the consequences of such violations may be entirely avoided.

It would be beneficial, I believe, to demonstrate the degree of tax loyalty of various groups of legal entities and individuals. The sizeable strata of small commercial firms, often with a fairly large turnover of capital, as well as persons engaged in entrepreneurship without the status of a legal entity, generally to not contribute a single ruble to the state treasury. The second and much more distinguished group—most of the medium-sized and large firms and joint-stock companies—do pay taxes, but on rather modest profits, concealing the main portion of their income from taxation. Under today's undeveloped tax legislation and weakness of the tax services, this is not difficult to do. At the same time, with the aid of corrupt officials, many firms and companies have managed to get various benefits and special favors for themselves.

The main tax burden is shouldered by the state enterprises and organizations which have funds, by a small part of the law-abiding entrepreneural structures, and by the Russian citizens who receive their wages according to registers. If we remember that such indeterminacy of tax loyalty is observed also "within the ranks" of subjects of the Federation, the monstrous inequity of the Russian tax policy becomes apparent. Its noose is pulled tight on the necks of the regions, the enterprises, and most of the working Russian citizens who comprise the non-numerous population of the law-abiding "fools." At the same time, the state itself, the parasites and the semi-parasites from the entrepreneurial circles, and the clever and unscrupulous self-willed underground merchants are placing all their weight on the free end of the rope, thereby strengthening the stranglehold.

[Correspondent] One does not have to be especially bright to come to the conclusion that this terrible stranglehold must immediately be eased and eliminated. Can this problem be solved, and if so, how?

[Romanov] There has been discussion about the need for restructuring the tax system almost from the very moment of its creation. Some demand that this system be immediately scrapped. Others speak out in favor of its evolutionary, step-by-step reorganization. I am among the latter group. But the question is, what direction should this reorganization follow?

The government has found an "axe under the counter." It intends to shift the primary burden of taxes onto the income of citizens and enterprises. But, as we have already noted, the "law-abiding fools" are even now not concealing their income. While the rich and super-rich, all these "new Russians," will find loopholes in the undeveloped legislation.

The plan for increasing fees on property is also controversial. Let me make the following comparison. A commercial firm leases a small building and quickly racks up considerable income, paying minimal tax on property, of which it has very little. Yet next door is a large defense enterprise which takes up extensive territory and has shops, many warehouses and auxiliary buildings. The production is barely keeping afloat—the state order is meager. Conversion is proceeding slowly. The law prohibits privatization of the enterprise. And so it is turning into some kind of a pauper, sitting on treasures which have become a burden, and paying taxes on them.

[Correspondent] And do you, in your presidential program, make provision for any steps to make the system of taxation a civilized means for uplifting and developing the economy?

[Romanov] Obviously. I have already spoken about the evolutionary character of this process. The state tax policy must become predictable. Only then can we speak of economic stabilization, of increasing the real investments in production. The tax system should be maximally simplified, so that each economic subject would understand its basic principles. We must reduce the number of types of fees. The system must operate automatically, as we see in the developed countries, without additional instructions. All the rules of the game must be the same for all participants in payment of taxes. We should limit the number of benefits to a minimum. Non-payment of taxes must become economically unprofitable, and the fines for such violation of the laws

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must increase several times over. And they should be collected directly from the firms and enterprises who conceal their profits.

And here is the last thing. In formulating the income portion of the budget, it is time that we increased the role of factors which today seem to be in the shadows. A major source of revenues to the state treasure must be the income from privatization, commercial use of state property, as well as foreign economic activity. Then there will be a real possibility for easing the tax press on goods producers and on all Russian citizens.

[Correspondent] You have several times touched upon the topic of violation of the tax legislation and corruption of the state apparatus. How do you evaluate the criminal climate of the country?

[Romanov] This climate is murderous. In the figurative and in the direct sense of the word. The criminal situation has become aggravated from the first months of the economic reform. These changes have reflected the contradictions in the life of our current Russian society. The very character of crime is changing at a rapid rate, and economic crime in growing. Our law enforcement agencies have encountered such new forms of violations as the unlawful export of large quantities of oil, fuel oil, other types of raw goods and strategic materials. We are also seeing a large counter flow of import contraband.

Crimes in the finance-banking sphere are an "innovation." These are misappropriations of huge sums with the aid of counterfeit bank remittance notes. An acute socio-political problem is fraud of investors in commercial banks and investment funds which, having collected billions of rubles, have discontinued the promised payments and do not intend to return to the Russian citizens the funds which were fraudulently extracted from them. The effective legislation has proven to be a "white hole," which has no means of combatting such a form of outright theft, robbery in broad daylight. This allows unscrupulous dealers to get rich and not to bear any responsibility for what they have done.

However, perhaps the most frightening phenomenon in our life has become the flourishing of organized crime and the strengthening of its ties with officialdom. Corruption has eaten into the state apparatus and permeated the organs of law and order and the judicial and prosecution structures.

The streets of large cities, restaurants, casinos, apartments and homes of entrepreneurs and bankers have become the scenes of bloody reprisals. The dealers settle accounts with their competitors in deals associated with the export and [illegible]essing of raw materials, the division of spheres of influence, the granting of licenses, etc. Moreover, the "sedate" entrepreneurs are ever more often resorting to the services of hired killers. Murder for hire is becoming a rather lucrative business. Its victims are more often deputies, prosecutors, judges, militia officials, journalists, and officials of organs of state power and administration. All this, I believe, is evidence of the fact that the government and the organs of executive power are losing control of the situation in the country, and in fact handing it over to the criminal-bureaucratic structures and the "shadow" financial centers which support them.

[Correspondent] I believe that we cannot blame the government for everything. The absence of the necessary legislation to combat financial crimes, corruption and other criminal manifestations is the result of the far from effective activity of both houses of parliament. The deputies of the State Duma, who have become carried away with factional struggles and political squabbles, have neither the time nor the strength left for serious and in-depth lawmaking activity. And so, unratified important new legal statutes and amendments to already existing ones lie around for months. Is it possible to bring about order in the country under these conditions?

[Romanov] The fight against crime is a complex problem which demands an integrated approach. I would like to state that this must be done in the most urgent manner.

As far as I know, the State Duma is currently completing work on improving the Criminal and Criminal-Procedural Codes, which provide stricter penalties for a number of specific legal violations. However, all these measures will be ineffective if the conditions stimulating the growth of crime are retained. These, primarily, are corruption, the propaganda of violence, debauchery, and sex, the absence of a nationwide program for bringing up the youth, the practically free circulation of weapons, the sale of narcotics, the distortions in the economic policy, etc. Aside from laws, we also need a unified state policy in this sphere. Specifically, in my opinion, it would be useful to implement, through the efforts of the law enforcement agencies and the FSB [Federal Security Service], a thorough verification of all foreigners from the "near abroad" on temporary stay in Russia, to determine their way of life, type of occupation, and source of income.

It is also important to precisely coordinate our work with the activity of similar structures in neighboring states. And the main thing is for the associates of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the prosecutor's office, and the judges themselves to believe that they are doing the right thing. The state must protect them in every way possible. At the present, they have no such faith.

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[Correspondent] Judging by your words, Petr Vasilyevich, you already have a rather well formulated program which you intend to present during the campaign for election of the country's president.

[Romanov] Such a program will evidently become crystallized in its final form by the beginning of this campaign. However, many of its positions have already been defined. I present them in the latest book which I recently completed, and which is tentatively titled, "With a Son's Pain About Russia."

[Correspondent] Why with pain? Why not with some other sensation, some other feeling?

[Romanov] I do not know about others, but in looking at today's Russia, lying in the ruins of economic and spiritual bankruptcy, I feel excruciating pain. And a son's burning shame for what has happened. How could we, Russian citizens, have allowed such a great country to find itself on the brink of destruction? If we are its faithful children, we must, having analyzed the reasons and the course of the current illness of society, decide how to bring the country back to the path of flourishing and prosperity. And such a path does exist, and we will embark upon it. For this we need only find the line of common accord unifying all Russian citizens, the idea of national rebirth.

Of course, all of this is not easy. Take our democrats, for example. Four years ago, in the Summer of '91, they appeared to be a strong unified movement, capable of turning the life of the country around. But this turned out to be another historical chimera. Having achieved the disintegration of the Soviet Union, having taken power into their own hands, having come to the help of the state, the Russian democrats exhibited a total inability to manage this state, to reorganize the life of society. Having quarreled over whose idea is better, having fought over the leadership chairs, they broke up into numerous party groups and ran to their respective ideological quarters. And they lost the trust of the people, having become the expressors of views of a narrow circle of intellectuals, being fed by domestic and foreign "moneybags," just in case.

The tragedy of Russia today consists of the abundance, the kaleidoscopic multitude of parties and various social movements and blocks. Most of them bring no new or beneficial ideas to the people. Even the communists, adherents of the socialist idea, have become divided into different parties of various caliber. Repeating the mistakes of former leaders, many of them are looking not forward, but backward, calling for the restoration of the Soviet Union in its previous form. Which today is unrealistic and simply impossible, because for this it is necessary to have the political will of not only the majority of Russian citizens, but also the peoples of the former union republics, which today have become independent states.

As you see, there is no political uniformity in society. But there are considerable progressive, healthy patriotic forces which are striving to uplift the economic might and spiritual forces of Russia. And this makes it possible to make the appeal: "Russians of all political directions—unite!" The basis for such unification and general accord may become the fruitful idea of creating a strong multi-national Russian democratic state, founded on our primary values: Truth, Good, Justice, common responsibility for the country and the people. On the traditions of collectivity and cooperation. On the self-government of the zemstvo from the bottom and a strong authority at the top, acting in all-national interests and relying on the "opinion of the land." On the principles of organization of the national economy with a mixed economy. We will create our own model of the Russian society of social justice.

[Correspondent] You mentioned the word, "collectivity," which many associate with religion. What role do you ascribe to it in the future formulation of Russia?

[Romanov] First of all, I would like to say that I have a respectful attitude toward all earthly religions, their confessions. A man is free to believe in any god. Or to be an atheist.

The Russian Orthodox Church is called upon to play a huge role in building a strong Russia. I was christened as a child, and my grandmother instilled the kernel of Orthodoxy into my consciousness. I know that Orthodoxy is the core of the Russian soul, into which a thirst for spiritual equality has been instilled. Through Orthodoxy, Russian patriotism came to us, our Russian statehood, a great power. We must know what to do today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow so that the results of these labors may be evaluated by our grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The judge of history, the judge of conscience and memory does not come down to pretty words. These "judges" really do exist, and we cannot avoid them. Only our deeds will remain after us on this earth. And so, let them be righteous and glorious.

[Correspondent] In preparing to participate in the electoral struggle for the chair of head of state, you have probably formed a notion about what qualities the president of such a country as Russia must possess?

[Romanov] I have given this much thought. I recalled the words of a leading Russian statesman of the 18th Century, Chancellor Aleksey Petrovich Bestuzhev-Ryumin, who said that there are two types of people.

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The first serve first of all themselves, and then Russia, while the second serve Russia, and then themselves. The future president of our country must be related to the second type.

The head of our state must know how to deeply analyze the events of past, ancient, years, as well as those of current ones. And to draw correct and far-sighted conclusions. I would liken his labor to the work of a gardener, cutting dry branches from trees so that the trees would grow and develop well, and bear rich fruit. And the president of Russia must learn to cut off with a firm hand all that does not bring benefit to the country.

In this sense, our great predecessors, the builders of mighty Russia, serve as an example to me. First I will name the wise unifier of the Russian lands, Ivan Kalita. Then we must recall Ivan the Terrible—a rather harsh and clever ruler, but undoubtedly a wise and far-sighted one. The most outstanding figure in our history before the 20th Century was Peter I, the great reformer of Russia. Yes, he was harsh and even cruel. Yes, he "broke" his enemies—the proponents of the old traditions. But he did so in the interests of Russia and its much-suffering people. Were it not for Peter, it is quite possible that our country would have remained an Asiatic fringe of Europe.

[Correspondent] From this, the conclusion suggests itself that presidential power must be, as they say today, strict and extremely authoritarian?

[Romanov] Here you are wrong. If I become president, one of my first steps would be to prepare a series of amendments to the current Constitution of the Russian Federation.

[Correspondent] And how does it displease you, Petr Vasilyevich? The new constitution established a presidential republic in our country. And after all, you yourself want to become president.

[Romanov] Yes, the constitution established a presidential republic. But it clearly went overboard in doing so. Then again, this is understandable: It was tailored for a specific president—Boris Yeltsin, who, as a former obkom [oblast committee] secretary and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has become accustomed to commanding and rejecting criticism. And the constitution gave him all the opportunities for this.

The intent of the constitution is to protect the rights of citizens against possible usurping encroachments by the state, and against the incompetency and voluntarism of its leaders. We have created an unprecedented legal (if you can call it that) hybrid, which concentrates significant and practically uncontrollable powers and authorities in the hands of the president. He does not enter into the system of branches of power, but stands above them. He does not head up the government and does not bear responsibility for its specific policy, although he does appoint the prime minister and all the ministers. Having legislative functions, the president adopts edicts and decisions on an unlimited circle of questions, and these edicts and decisions have the force of legal statutes. One such document was the secret decision of the Security Council signed by B. Yeltsin, which marked the beginning of the war in Chechnya.

The constitution has clearly understated the legislative branch and the role of its supreme body—parliament. Its control functions are limited to ratification and verification of fulfillment of the federal budget. The State Duma is deprived of the opportunity of determining the complement and structure of the government. Even in rejecting the candidacy of the prime minister proposed by the president, this body is forced to act circumspectly. If it rejects the same candidacy three times, it will be immediately disbanded.

I have touched upon only some of the gaps in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Naturally, there are many more of them. This is what forces jurists and state leaders to pose the question of introducing amendments to it. In my opinion, the Basic Law must create a normal model of a presidential republic. Under which the head of state heads up the government and answers fully for its policy.

Further improvements in the constitution will be the work of the new complement of parliament deputies, which will be elected in December of this year.

[Correspondent] As long as you have mentioned the upcoming elections, tell us, please, how do you evaluate the chances of the NDR block—"Our House—Russia," headed by the prime minister?

[Romanov] Frankly, I was surprised by this initiative. The government promises to make this year the year of breakthrough for the better in the economy. Yet Russian citizens do not see or feel this, even though one-third of the year has already passed. Prices are growing, inflation is declining at a snail's pace, and many enterprises are on the brink of stoppage. How can the "party of power"—that is what politicians and journalists have christened the NDR—expect success under such conditions? Especially since the reports about universal support of this block evoke obvious scepticism. You know, it is like in the taiga: The tops of the trees are making noise from the gusts of wind, but below it is quiet. Support for the NDR is announced primarily by the leaders of local organs of executive power (in their official capacity), while the rank-and-

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file Russian citizens are as yet in no hurry to sign up for the electorate of the new electoral block.

***Prospects for Rybkin Election Campaign Assessed**

954F2349A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
11 May 95 p 4

[Article by V. Bodarev: "Rybkin's Bloc: To Be or Not To Be?"

[FBIS Translated Text] **Nothing will come of the left-to-center bloc which Ivan Rybkin is going to form; that is the judgment of most of the politicians and the mass media. There are sufficient grounds for skepticism. The very clumsy form in which that idea appeared did little to promote the success of party building. From a purely pragmatic viewpoint it is understandable that the announcement regarding the creation of an electoral bloc on the initiative of Yeltsin was designed to repulse potential followers of the speaker with a critical attitude toward the regime. It turned out that Rybkin almost betrayed his comrades in arms, who entrusted the chairmanship to him in hope of seeing him become a moderate and at the same time an unbending opponent of the regime, but it turned out that the speaker, who was already actively collaborating with the president as it were, became a representative of Yeltsin on the left flank.**

It is worth noting that Rybkin's comrades in arms, and primarily agrarians and communists, displayed a remarkably calm attitude when it became known that the speaker had in fact betrayed them. On the one hand his tendency to draw closer to the Kremlin became evident quite some time ago, but on the other hand they clearly do not want to give up on him and apparently not without reason, inasmuch as Ivan Petrovich has not abandoned his patriotism or his sympathies for socialism. What is most important is that his differences with "the comrades" boil down to an aspiration for gradual reforms rather than a drive toward radical change in the political course on which both the agrarians and the communists are insisting. The fact that Rybkin was not subjected to ostracism and condemnation by his socialist comrades indicates that despite radical declarations by leaders, sufficiently moderate moods, which are being voiced by the speaker, wield considerable power among the party masses. Consequently the agro-communists are compelled to take into account the moods of their electorate and not engage in a struggle with Rybkin as a traitor.

As of today the Duma chairman has not been too successful in realizing the Kremlin initiative. In its own way that is logical. It is true that if he wants to achieve a goal in this concrete situation, he has to take pause. It is necessary to wait until the impact of the clumsy representation of the left-to-center bloc by the president weakens. There is no doubt that this will occur after a certain period of time. It is still quite a long time until the elections and it is possible to wait. That is less important because many of those who are decisively denying the possibility of entering that bloc will start making a more sober evaluation of their prospects and will feel a certain hesitancy; those already occupying deputy seats do not want to leave them very much, and with the approach of elections such a prospect is becoming all the more evident to them.

Let us look at the Agrarian Party, one of those on which the speaker had apparently been counting. It appears to have a stable electorate, the situation in agriculture continues to deteriorate, the reforms are not doing well, and the agrarians had about 10 percent of the votes in the last elections. All that infuses General Secretary of the Agrarian Party Lapshin with confidence in that his party will be able to do without any blocs. That, however, is questionable. Voting results alone do not indicate that the voters will always act the same way. By contrast with past elections when competition was limited on the national-communist flank, the current situation has become more complex. The stronger communists, it appears, are also laying claim to the kolkhoz members, along with Rutskoy and other patriots, as well as a rather powerful group of politicians which gathered in the Congress of Russian Communities (Skokov, Govorukhin, Lebed, Stroyev). Molding of the party of power into the right-to-center bloc of Chernomyrdin may also influence the positions of the regional elite which formerly supported the agrarians. The appearance of Rybkin's bloc may likewise lead to a loss of part of the voters by Lapshin. It may be possible that the agrarians might not only fail to get 10 percent, but they may not even receive five percent and could find themselves out of the running. In addition to that, in two years the leadership by the agrarians has not had any colorful leadership and the rank and file voter is practically unfamiliar with them so they might miss out. There is no doubt that such a variant will not suit Lapshin and those of his ilk. Perhaps they will give it some thought, conduct some sociological surveys, and agree to collaborate with the speaker.

The trade unions will not be willing to support Rybkin now either. It would be interesting to know what their leaders are hoping for and how it could be that they do not want to obtain their own mandates? By themselves they have no chance of success for a slate of their own. All that remains is for them to join with someone. The speaker, however, continues to represent himself as a

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socialist; that is, a defender of the workers. If matters go well for Rybkin, then the trade union leaders will of course be coming to him. Where else can they turn? Certainly not to the government bloc. There is nothing for them in other party blocs either.

So far "The Women of Russia" have not wanted to join with the speaker. For some reason they believe that the voters will be alienated again and will vote for them. It is very doubtful that masses of voters know who Fedulova or Lakhova are. Why do they need to experiment once again with an independent appearance? If they continue to refuse to join the left-to-center bloc, however, the loss to the latter will be small.

Where are the socialist and the social democrats to turn? Their influence is not very strong and they have no well-known leaders. Therefore it is necessary to join someone. If they join Rybkin, their chances will be rather good. In addition to the social democrats, there are also quite a few small parties (for example, the Industrial Party), whose leaders, having joined a powerful bloc, could break through to the parliament. In the last elections, for instance, Yandinskiy brought the leadership of three parties on his coattails—the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic Party. This is what it means to make an effort and register on a promising list!

The situation is not that simple with the party of power, Chernomyrdin's bloc, either. Here there will most likely be excessive numbers. There are more than 100 Duma deputies alone prepared to join the right-to-center lineup. It appears that there are willing individuals in the regions as well. If previous elections were intermediary and the terms were only two years, now the deputy chair is most comfortable offering a four-year term. Even if the norm remains the same—225:225, the current distribution of mandates between parties and regions—then problems arise with the formation of a slate. Let us assume the right-to-center gets 30 percent, that is 70 mandates, as Shakhray promises. Regional heads will demand their share for those of "their own," and there will be quite a few contenders in Moscow as well. The following problem arises before many politicians: Is it better to be 71st on Chernomyrdin's slate, for instance, or 17th on Rybkin's slate? Therefore for some there is nothing left but to try their luck not with the premier but in other company. If Rybkin should start becoming successful, there would be enough candidates for the second party of power, particularly since authority itself, as is clear, will promote Rybkin.

Up to now we have spoken about so-called objective premises. The subjective ones, however, are just as important; that is the presence or absence of data or possibilities necessary for the speaker to form a bloc.

An individual who managed to organize the work of the Duma, a task that was considered not solvable, clearly possesses good organizational abilities. Yes, at present he lacks the necessary structures. Shakhray's PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], "The Women of Russia," and the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] also had nothing at the time the election campaign in 1993 was declared. Two months was all that was necessary in order to enter the elections and win the mandates. Why couldn't Rybkin do the same?

Now about the ideology. Will Rybkin be able to formulate his position with sufficient clarity in order to find his niche? In other words, how will he prove that his party is in some way better than others, or at least different from them? Voters, of course, do not delve very deeply into slogans or the isms, but the politicians themselves need some kind of ideological orientation in order to work out the strategy of an election campaign. Rybkin apparently has three key principles which he is defending. The first one is social democratism, that is criticism of purely capitalist methods of transformation with emphasis on the needs of workers and the dispossessed. The second one is patriotism and great power mentality: attraction to historical values, nostalgia for the USSR, and underscoring of the need for extension of assistance to Russian-speaking people in all of the CIS. The third one is rejection of political radicalism and an aspiration toward stability, actually toward the consolidation of the current political regime. He has allies and opponents regarding any of the points, but if we take all three of them simultaneously it turns out that an independent position manifests itself. Thus the left-to-center bloc will differ from the right-to-center bloc by its more vividly expressed socialistic nature, gradualism, and patriotism. With virtually the same main slogans, Rybkin differs from his irreconcilable opposition in the degree of his radicalism. The speaker favors moderation and gradualism with preservation of stability.

As indicated by experience, however, the proclaimed principles are not what is most important. It is more important to have the ability to win the sympathy of the voters in the course of the election campaign and to have colorful leaders. It is, of course, difficult to call Rybkin an extraordinary or a notable speaker. Still, thanks to the mass media, over the past year and a half the entire country has learned about him, whereas many others are not known to the voters. The speaker has the image of an ordinary average citizen, it is possible to say a lower middle class Soviet citizen, a plain "Russian Ivan," calm and level-headed. Will such a politician attract

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the sympathy of the Russians? It is possible to assume that in the provinces, where they are disappointed with radicals, people who are excessively colorful and even challenging, they will this time support and vote for just such politicians. By the way, Rybkin looks like a good guy from movies of the fifties. Therefore he might appeal to the pensioners.

Few have any doubt that the new bloc will have the money.

In summarizing it is possible to say the following: if Ivan Rybkin starts working actively he has chances of creating a bloc and overcoming the 5 percent barrier. At present, of course, he might still refuse because the task confronting him is highly complicated. Then his political prospects appear highly doubtful. If in a future Duma both potential blocs do not occupy sufficiently powerful positions and victory is won by former comrades in arms of Rybkin, then he will never be elected Duma chairman.

It is not difficult to see that such a result would lead to serious consequences for him. At the same time the speaker is also viewed as a serious contender for the post of president.

***Latsis Continues Polemics Over CPRF Program**

954Q0198A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 May 95 p 4

[Article by Otto Latsis: "New Ideologists, Old Ideas: Communists Hope To Deceive the Gullible Once Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the just-held celebrations of Victory Day, only the veterans themselves, it seems, did not take pains to prove that the victory belonged to them. Many politicians zealously sought to affirm their special right to inherit the glory of the generation that, half a century ago, spared nothing to carry the red banner to the Reichstag. And at a demonstration of the "state-patriotic forces" on Lubyanka Square, there were fresh calls for "raising the banner of victory over the Kremlin." This compels us to return to a discussion that began long before the holiday.

On the 'Power of the People.'

On 14 February 1995, IZVESTIYA published my article about the Communist Party of the Russian Federation's (CPRF) new program. On 23 March, PRAVDA ROSSII (the weekly supplement to PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA), published Valentina Nikiforova's discussion with Nikolay Bindyukov, the recently elected secretary of the CPRF Central Committee for ideological work. The occasion for the discussion, as was pointed out in the very first sentence, was my "malicious and unfair observations."

It was a rather harsh beginning, but so be it. What did bother me was the theoretical views. In what way were my observations "unfair"? That remains unknown. N. Bindyukov barely mentioned my arguments. Except perhaps for this statement: "Latsis is being sly in trying to frighten gullible people with camps for "restructurers" and "reformers." But it is Comrade Bindyukov who is being sly here. It wasn't me who wrote about "enemies of socialism"—it was the CPRF that included that frightening point in its program. I only cited the original source of that thesis, about which the authors of the program "forgot" to tell their readers: It was taken almost word for word from the Stalin report that signaled the massive repressions of 1937.

When one is reluctant to talk about the content of an article, one can talk about its author. Comrade Bindyukov has not forgotten this technique of ideological warfare, and so he declares at the outset: "I knew Latsis from when we worked together in the secretariat of the 27th CPSU Congress. He was a man, and not a rank and file CPSU member, incidentally, who had no doubt about the correctness of socialist and communist ideas. What happened to him? Did he break under the dehumanization of our society?"

Well, alright, let us believe that Latsis is a primitive renegade. But a bad person can speak the truth too. And what is the real truth about the CPRF program? I, for example, wrote that judging from that document, there are fewer and fewer communist elements in the ideology of today's communists. Instead of updating the socialist slogans, the CPRF is increasingly adopting alien, nationalistic slogans. It is no longer immediately apparent just who is the Zyuganovite and who the Zhirinovskiyite. But it is at this point that Comrade Bindyukov becomes hard of hearing: He doesn't hear what people are saying to him, and that's all there is to it. He gives the following answer: "Are the socialist slogans all that bad—power to the people in the form of the Soviets, social guarantees for the working people?"

Incidentally, I don't have anything bad to say about the slogans, they used to be very good. One time, I remember, I measured a slogan in paces on the street: It was 80 steps long, about two meters high, and it contained about 50 cubic meters of brick. The slogans were excellent, but I never once encountered popular rule in my life under the CPSU dynasty. Social guarantees—yes, there were some. Everyone was even paid for their work in identical paper bills, no matter who held what position. True, some then took those bills to an inconspicuous store that had no sign but did

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have comrades, while the others took theirs to a public store that had a sign but no goods.

There were not enough goods for everybody: People didn't have time to worry about that. Even today many sigh about the time when the most important thing was to produce, albeit by no means goods. I recently witnessed a discussion in which an elderly defense-industry worker accusingly asked his opponent, who was arguing in favor of conversion:

"Where's the money you took from us? The defense order has been cut by two-thirds, and we don't have any money. But who does have it? There's no money for education, health care, research. What happened to it?"

Although the question is a naive one from an economist's standpoint, behind it are serious conflicts. Cutting the defense order was the fundamental cause of the overall decline in industrial production (production in the defense sector itself and in the civilian sectors that serve it). This decline, in turn, is one of the main points of the indictment handed down by the "proponents of the state" to the reformers. Comrade Zyuganov himself, in summing up the results of the victory celebration in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for 18 May (the text has the noteworthy title "We Follow the Victors"), repeated once more the figures for that decline. And V. Nikiforova and N. Bindyukov pose the question point-blank: "The Communists simply can't lose the upcoming elections. It's the country's last chance for survival." What followed is familiar—about a national salvation government. And N. Bindyukov speculates about even the more remote future: "In the next elections, the people should state their preference for one party, and it should form its own government."

We have already lived under one party and "its own government," there's no doubt about that. But how will they cope with the production slump after so much discussion of it? It is possible to make Russian industry more competitive and to reorganize it, but this will take years and some very hard work. The Zyuganovites call such a course the "collapse" of Russia and other unflattering names. On the other hand, if you need an easy and quick "upsurge," you have to turn away from a market economy to the methods of the past, when the state pays for everything. Then you can turn out unneeded weapons and worthless civilian goods that people wouldn't pay real money for, although they would take them "for nothing." Whether this is good or bad, and who it might be good for, is a separate discussion. The first question is, is it possible? How will the state pay for it? And we return to the question of the perplexed defense-industry worker: What happened to the money that the state was able to find for such a long time?

The answer to it is simple and sad: There is no more of that money. The government that came to power 10 years ago had the entire Soviet Union to administer, but reforms began only on Russian territory in January 1992. In the early 1980s, the USSR had virtually no foreign debt; but in 1991 Russia inherited from it a debt of $80 billion; servicing that debt would take $15 billion to $20 billion a year (if we could cope with it without deferments). The USSR once had billions of dollars in foreign exchange and thousands of metric tons of gold—but none of this remained at the time of its collapse. In short, the USSR piled up these debts in the final years of its existence, and Russia is trying to repay them.

From the standpoint of popular economics, arms production is not income, but an expenditure (arms production for export is an exception, but it can account for only a small part of the "defense sector," for it is constrained by the limits of its competitiveness, the size of the market, and political and legal barriers). Like any expenditure, it should be reduced to a reasonable minimum. Throughout the postwar years, however, it was inflated to an unreasonable maximum. This costly production, combined with inefficient civilian enterprises, swallowed up the resources of not only the present, but also the future. In the 1990s, we are paying interest on foreign loans taken out in the 1980s. We are rebuilding gold and foreign exchange reserves that were squandered then and earlier. We are patching up collapsing infrastructure worn out during decades of use, cleaning up accidents, and doing more patching. We are impotently struggling with the problem of how to restore savings amassed during the decades of empty store shelves, when "guns instead butter" were produced and wages were paid for them, but there were no goods to back them up.

A lot of things are not being done today the way they should be. But it not for the people of yesterday to act as prosecutors. They are the ones who squandered the resources we once had. They lived beyond their means 30, 20 and 10 years ago, and borrowed everything they could from those who live today. And when the "defenders of socialism" today ask where the former prosperity is, there can be but one answer: Ask the leaders of the party to which you call yourselves successors.

No, I am not against socialism, if that word is used to mean a system of genuine social justice. It's just that I don't see how you can make socialism the mainspring of a modern social mechanism and keep it from becoming inviable in the process. But when people nod to Soviet

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"socialism," I lose interest: After the 70-year failure, idle theoretical talk on this subject is unconvincing.

Nor do I object to the steady development that Zyuganov's party likes to talk about these days. On the contrary, I am wholeheartedly for it. But again, N. Bindyukov's hearing difficulties impede an honest discussion. For I wrote in my last article that I consider the concept of steady development to be the country's only salvation. But I do not believe that it can be brought about by the proponents of the "centrally planned socialist economy," because that kind of an economy and an economy of steady development are antipodes. In response, my interlocutors in PRAVDA ROSSII try to tell me that steady development is good. Alright then, let's talk about steady development.

About the 'Bugbear of Stalin.'

The reader should not be surprised that this author promised a discussion about steady development, but then promptly wrote a heading about Stalin. It's not me, but N. Bindyukov who somehow sees a direct link between the two. In response to his interlocutor's question about steady development, he gave the following answer:

"A party cannot live without fresh ideas. And when we formulated our strategy, we liked this concept very much and supported it. It's futile to try to scare us with the bugbear of Stalin. I don't know about other people, but we Belorussians know what bondage is, we know what would have happened to the entire Soviet people were it not for the victory in the Great Patriotic War, from which Stalin cannot be erased."

Did you understand anything, reader? I understood one thing: that Stalin was, in N. Bindyukov's opinion, the embodiment of steady development. Now that's something to think about.

Who of us doesn't remember: For decades, our Soviet school textbooks told us that the first five-year plan was fulfilled in four years and three months. This was imprinted in the memory of generations as an immutable fact. But it is untrue. I tried to find the original source of this claim and become convinced that Soviet statistical documents confirming it do not exist. The original source was Stalin's report at the joint plenary session of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on 10 January 1933, in which it was stated: The plan was fulfilled—period. It is useless to look for comparisons there—that so much production of a given type of product was planned in the final year of the five-year plan, and that so much was actually produced. There is much more discussion there about the crisis in America. I myself selected from party and state documents various assignments for various sectors and compared them with the actual Soviet statistics on actual production in 1932, when the five-year plan ended.

The results stunned me. If we set aside the few value indices, which are essentially meaningless in this particular case, not a single assignment was fulfilled in physical terms. For example, cast iron, around which more political battles than anything else were fought, the initial version of the plan proposed production of 7 million metric tons in the final year of the five-year plan. (Let me remind you that the initial assignment was said to be a more modest one, and that its proponents were all branded right deviationists and subsequently shot). The "optimal" version confirmed by the party called for 10 million metric tons. Soon, under the pressure of the Stalinist slogan "Fulfill the Five-Year Plan in Four Years!" the "optimal version" itself was revised, and cast iron production was set at 17 million tons. In fact, 6.2 million tons of cast iron was smelted in 1932. A figure of 10 million tons was achieved only in 1934, and 17 million in 1950.

The first five-year plan's assignment for coal and tractors was met in 1933, the first year of the second five-year plan; its targets for oil and iron ore production were fulfilled in 1934, for electric power, steel, rolled metal, and automobiles in 1935, for paper and cardboard in 1936, for cotton fabric and granulated sugar in 1951, and for wool fabric in 1956. The first five-year plan's assignments for consumer goods were met in the fifth and sixth five-year plans! On the other hand, the targets for heavy industry were met in the middle of the second five-year plan, for the most part. In general, not one of our 12 five-year plans was fulfilled, but the collapse of the first five-year plan was the most deafening, and most of the credit for that collapse goes to Stalin personally. The collapse was covered up with endless talk about mass labor enthusiasm, which did indeed exist—and so the authorities who squandered it to no avail are all the more to blame.

It would be ridiculous to argue over whether industrialization was needed in the first place. But all countries go through that stage of history. Could we have gone through it more quickly and with fewer losses, and could we have built our industry better than others? Yes, we could have. This was possible by virtue of both the material and manpower resources of a great country and the scholarly potential of the remarkable economists who lived in Russia at that time. But the power monopoly of a single party (and ultimately of a single man) could not allow that potential to become a reality. Resources were expended wastefully and foolishly, and the remarkable economists were at best ignored, and at worst destroyed.

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Despite that, the rate of industrial development was high. This was achieved through the ruthless exploitation of the entire population (rationing of goods was introduced at the start of the first five-year plan—the only instance in history in which this was done in peacetime). But "in the interests of industrialization," the countryside was subjected to uniform destruction; not only its economic potential, but its human potential too, were crushed. Where agriculture in those years is concerned, one doesn't have to discuss the question of whether production growth was big or small: There was no growth at all, only decline. The data for gross harvests and crop yields in the early 1930s were not published in statistical compilations until 1987.

And let us recall the organized famine of 1933, which claimed 10 million lives at a time when the harvest was sufficient. The grain was exported to earn hard currency for industrialization. Today, some 60 years later, the countryside has yet to recover from the "centrally planned" blows to its genetic potential, and it will apparently never be able to recover.

It is ridiculous to say that all this strengthened the country on the eve of Hitler's attack. But it is even more ridiculous when today's communist ideologists try to portray this historical experience as proof that socialism is better suited to steady development.

On the Usefulness of Rereading PRAVDA.

But if this is how I have seen all these things for some time, how is it that Comrade Bindyukov remembers me as such an orthodox communist "when we worked together in the secretariat of the 27th congress"—in other words, quite recently, in 1990? I don't know, I become lost in conjecture. That is, I did participate in the congress. Amid the democratic erosion of the regime, I had been elected a delegate, and was subsequently nominated for membership in the Central Committee—not by order of the apparatus, but by communists in Moscow's Khoroshevskiy Rayon (where I wasn't even registered), acting on their own initiative. However, I do not have the pleasure of knowing N. Bindyukov, and there is no way I could have known him "when we worked together in the congress secretariat." I was not a member of the secretariat, and V. Nikiforova could have seen this for herself by looking at her own newspaper—PRAVDA for 2 July 1990. Incidentally, I didn't find N. Bindyukov's name on the list of secretariat members either.

What he did in the secretariat and in what capacity I don't know. But I didn't go to the secretariat, and I would never have been admitted, for party democracy did not extend that far. The secretariat, as I saw during the congress, was an instrument of the hidden but real power at the congress, a means of control over the delegates to the "party's highest authority." For example, when a group of delegates who were members of creative unions, on the initiative of Yegor Yakovlev, organized the publication of their own newspaper, entitled TRINADTSATYY MIKROFON [The Thirteenth Microphone], at the congress, it was the secretariat that confiscated the printing of the first edition.

There is another reason why N. Bindyukov could not remember me there as very orthodox. The 27th CPSU Congress was preceded by the founding congress of the RSFSR Communist Party, about which I published an article in IZVESTIYA, describing the fraud-ridden machinations in setting up the new party and electing Ivan Polozkov as its leader. If, contrary to expectation, N. Bindyukov didn't read IZVESTIYA at that time, did he at least hear the debate at the congress? For that article I was expelled from the original editorial commission, and this matter was raised at the congress. All this is recorded in the first volume of the stenographic record—I hope it can be found in PRAVDA's library.

The fanciful memory of Comrade Bindyukov, who forgets what happened at the congress but remembers what did not, scarcely merits public attention. And there was no need for him to wonder exactly when I, as he put it, "broke." I can myself can say when this happened: It was not in the 1990s, as he speculates, but in the 1960s. My last hopes that the CPSU was capable of reforming itself were shattered on 21 August 1968, when the Soviet tanks rolling through Prague suppressed not only Czechoslovak reforms, but also our own.

It was after that that I decided to do my own study of how the regime under whose power we lived arose and consolidated itself. The purely historical character of my manuscript devoted to the Stalin "breakthrough" of 1929 did not rid it of the KGB's attention: It was confiscated from a comrade of mine in 1975. For me, this ended in the following entry in my party registration card: "For antiparty views set forth in the manuscript 'Prior to 1937' and its transfer to another person, Comrade O.R. Latsis merited expulsion from the CPSU. In view of the fact that he acknowledged the political errors he committed and promised to take only party positions in his work henceforth, received a positive reference...from his workplace, and had not been held to party account previously, CPSU party member O.R. Latsis was issued a strict reprimand, to be noted on his registration card."

For me and for four other people who were involved in that incident in one way or another or not involved in it at all, this ended in our being fired from our jobs and in various kinds of later difficulties, all the

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way up until the first years of perestroika. The report was signed by Arvid Pelshe, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the Party Control Commission. I repeat, specifically for Comrade Bindyukov's benefit: The CPSU's highest authority certified my antiparty orientation not after 1990, but in 1975. As the text makes clear, I acknowledged the fairness of that finding and, incidentally, never disputed it subsequently. We were lucky: The authorities apparently decided that making a big fuss would be detrimental to themselves, and we got off unusually lightly. Against the backdrop of the genuine tragedies of millions of people, these were mere scratches. I have not deemed it necessary to recall them publicly, despite the fact that in recent years PRAVDA (and not PRAVDA alone) has on several occasions returned to the myth of my supposed degeneration from true Brezhnevite to staunch Yeltsinite.

This does not offend me today: Let them console themselves. But all this is just one individual example of certain general perceptions held by today's Russian communists. In promising the voters, should they win the elections, a new edition of socialism, they cannot evade the following question: Why did your past attempt fail after 70 years in power in a great country? Some people argue: Was the socialist system fundamentally inviable, or did a good system fall into the wrong hands? In my view, it is an idle argument: If the system was capable of allowing unsuitable leaders to the helm, that is the primary proof of the unsuitability of the system itself.

However, the ideologists of the CPRF take a different view: The idea of Soviet socialism was good, but the implementation let it down. That may be, but what guarantee is there that in a new attempt, the implementation will be better? They answer: We have taken the mistakes into account. But neither the program of the CPRF nor speeches by its leaders show any admission of guilt for the past. The successors to our former rulers have condemned neither the Stalinist genocide against our own people, nor the unthinking dissipation of the Brezhnev era. The admission of past mistakes is limited to a condemnation of what the Zyuganovites call betrayal—to a condemnation of Gorbachev's perestroika. The concept of a "betrayal" has become their obsession. They try to portray everyone who dares criticize them as renegades and ignore the essence of their criticism. If they themselves believe this, they will undoubtedly begin, should they come to power, to eradicate that "betrayal," as in the past.

And they intend to take this impoverished analysis of 70 years of tragedy to the people who shook off their power less than four years ago? What are they pinning their hopes on? They are pinning their hopes on young people—N. Bindyukov speaks about this in his discussion, and it was conspicuous during the celebrations on 9 May. It is easy to deceive young people today, not only on account of their natural inexperience in life; today's 20-year-olds were seven years old when Brezhnev left the scene, and the era of stagnation for them is only history. History that they not only did not experience, but that they did not learn about in books either, because they attended school during the years of the vacuum of history education: The old textbooks had been thrown out, but no new ones had been written. And now they are entering adult life amid a vacuum of overall national ideal, something that is especially hard to endure for those who do not live for the sake of material abundance. And N. Bindyukov is the sort who isn't at a loss for ideas. He offers an old and worn idea, but young people never saw how bankrupt it was. Can it be that every generation has to traverse the same path of illusion and disenchantment? It would be an unforgivable mistake for the Russian intelligentsia to permit such a thing.

*Leftist Political Youth Organizations Surveyed

954Q0204A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian May 95 No 21, [Signed to press 23 May 95] pp 12-13

[Article by Yuliya Kantor under the rubric "Parties": "Young Lions: Komsomol Members, Molodaya Gvardiya Members, Young Bolsheviks, and Even Pioneers—Russia Has Them All"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Against the background of the political mess prevailing in Russia, youth organizations created on its territory in the last few years are still in the shadows. Their coming into the light may prove to be a surprise for the country's political life and have an unpredictable effect.

Gone to rest in peace even without death agonies, the All-Union Komsomol left a successor: the Russian Communist Youth League, which has existed since January 1993. The Russian Komsomol, which operates under the wing of the Communist Party, is at present the largest leftist oriented youth structure: it unites about 1,500 young Russian citizens. "Moored" to Gennadiy Zyuganov's party and having distanced itself from Viktor Anpilov's overly extravagant Russian Communist Workers Party, the Komsomol members acquired a certain respectability and along with it some weight among "moderate" youth. The first secretary of the Russian Komsomol Central Committee, Igor Malyarov, is "making" a party career in parallel with his Komsomol career. He is simultaneously a candidate member of the RF Communist Party and assistant to Leonid Petrovskiy, a State Duma deputy from the communist faction.

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The second secretary of the Russian Komsomol Central Committee, Valentina Ponomarenko, has surpassed Comrade Malyarov on the party level, having already become a member of the RF CP Central Committee. The respectable leaders of the Russian Komsomol members have now distanced themselves from their "masses," who are not impressed by the pompous party meetings and laborious preparation for the upcoming elections. The conflict between the Zyuganov "elite" and the "masses," who are gravitating toward the bold Anpilovites, threatens to split the Komsomol and deprive the Russian Federation Communist Party of worthy continuers of its work.

The Followers of Pavka

Zyuganov's Communist Party, alarmed by the fates of the adolescent generation, is the patron of one other organization with the ringing name Molodaya Smena [New Generation of Youth]. Its activity is for now limited to Moscow's Garden Ring and a few rayons of St. Petersburg. Not long ago three members were brought into the St. Petersburg organization, which until recently consisted of eight people. It would hardly be worth speaking of such replenishments if not for their ideological sympathies—all the "recruits" are members of Soyuz Venedov [Union of Venedi], one of the most radical national-patriotic organizations of the Northwest Region. However, such a dual party status is nothing new for the communist party, whose activists participate in various measures of the Soyuz.

The All-Union Molodaya gvardiya bolshevikov [Youth Guard of Bolsheviks] is close to Nina Andreyeva's All-Union Party of Bolsheviks. Created in St. Petersburg in June 1992, it represents a youth organization fostering the traditions of the "1917 model" of young champions of the radiant future. The "criminal ruling regime," the "sharks of imperialism," and the "renegade appeasers" are inevitably reviled at the meetings of the Bolshevik Gvardiya. The Molodaya gvardiya bolshevikov, of whom there are no more than a few dozen in Russia, has nonetheless been able to multiply through dividing. Some of the young orthodox Leninists who are dissatisfied with Nina Andreyeva's policies have declared their independence.

Thus, as a result of the struggle of loyal Leninists against even more loyal ones, two "panopticums" which have preserved the fanaticism of Pavka Korchagin and his generation in unspoiled freshness have formed on the Russian political horizon.

The Studencheskaya zashchita [Student Defense] trade union is becoming increasingly noticeable in the circle of Russia's opposition youth movements recently. Born a year ago in the capital, Studencheskaya zashchita announced itself with a noisy protest demonstration against nonpayment of stipends accompanied by attempted street pogroms. The leaders of the trade union, who came from the anarchist milieu at one time in the past, consider extremism an essential feature of their activity. So measures combined with street riots have accompanied the activities of Studencheskaya zashchita throughout its short but stormy life.

The trade union's latest measure was an April demonstration which resulted in several people being injured, and not without the participation of Studencheskaya zashchita activists. Muscle play is obviously considered one of the stages of the theoretical training of members of Studencheskaya zashchita. Thus, for example, the trade union newspaper BUMBARASH publishes on its pages an unusual "Guide to Action." In it you will find recommendations on equipping demonstrators, advice "not to keep beating a policeman who is down," and in addition advice on "using metal rods and bottles with incendiary mixtures."

Both the Moscow and the St. Petersburg leaders of the trade union attend classes in the schools of journalism at MGU [Moscow State University] and St. Petersburg State University in their time off from work. More and more Studencheskaya zashchita is declaring its intention to direct youth discontent into the "necessary channel." It is difficult not to agree with the grounds for these promises, since the student body, brought to despair by the open indifference of the authorities, may follow the leaders under catchy slogans like "I love you, revolution" and "Long live high-calorie buns!"

In the Name of Lavrentiy Palych...

In speaking of the youth opposition movement, it would be unfair not to mention such powerful and colorful political structures as the Za vozrozhdeniye SSSR [For the Restoration of the USSR] Youth Union imeni L. P. Beria and the Revolutionary Youth Union Smert burzhuyam [Death to the Bourgeois]. These organizations which were born and operate in the city of three revolutions number a few dozen people and limit themselves to popularizing the ideas of Mao Zedung, Beria, and other leaders of the world proletariat. Besides demands for the "physical elimination of the bourgeoisie" and a "second edition of world revolution," the Smert burzhuyam Union also fights for free sale of narcotics.

Russia's leftist movement also watches over adolescents. Thus, among other things, Pioneer organizations have been resurrected in Petersburg and Moscow largely by the efforts of peers of Oktyabr. The residents of the northern capital at times have the pleasure of beholding

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boys and girls with red kerchiefs frozen in the Pioneer salute on the steps of Kazan Cathedral during the latest communist holiday. Ideological work among Pioneers is conducted both in meetings of "professional revolutionaries" and in natural settings, where the pioneer leaders from the Komsomol milieu take the "young shoots."

Despite the abundance of loud statements and the equally loud names, the mosaic of Russia's opposition youth movement looks fairly harmless. Above all this is because of the small numbers and fragmented nature of the organizations. Moreover, not one leftist organizational structure has actually formulated a real program of actions. The youth organizations which in some cases operate under the leadership of the communists and sometimes drift freely are unlikely to be capable of serious actions in the near future. Small riots and scandalous slogans will obviously remain their lot. Nonetheless, they are the ones who may play the role of detonator if the youth milieu, which for now is reddish, is won over by the lovers of another color—brown.

Media Issues

*Journalists Surveyed on Importance of Regional Press

954F2357A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian 3-16 May 95 No 12, p 9

[Article by Andrey Zhdankin: "The Provincial Journalist: Brush Strokes Toward a Portrait"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow is far from being all of Russia. The capital, of course, has many pluses, but most of the country's life takes place in the provinces. If the press is the mirror of processes taking place in society, a kind of thermometer that shows its temperature, it gives a more accurate picture in the provinces than in the capital. Moscow newspapers write extremely little about the problems of the provincial press and journalists; their orbits of professional interest do not coincide. Today we shall try to partly rectify this shortcoming and add to readers' ideas of those who bear the difficult journalistic burden beyond the Sadovyy Ring. One of our great compatriots said that the provinces were not a place of residence but a way of thinking. The provinces have enriched the country and the capital with many extremely great and original minds. Recently the Fund for the Defense of Glasnost, through the efforts of Vsevolod Vilchek's sociological service, conducted a sociological survey of almost 1,300 journalists from eight major centers in Russia: Arkhangelsk, Voronezh, Yekaterinburg, Kazan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, and Samara. Their answers formed a "portrait" of the Russian provinces' press corps.

The assessments that provincial journalists give of the popularity of various media outlets are interesting. Ostankino leads in the television section. It was given a mark of "5," "greatest importance," by 32 percent of those surveyed. Second is RTV (Russian Television, Channel 2). NTV [Independent Television] came in behind both of the others on the general list, but one must take into account the fact that it is by no means received in all territories. Although central television's monopoly has been totally lost, local state television has proved inadequate in virtually every region, despite decent financing.

The situation is different, but also surprising, in the newspaper department. Regional publications dominate almost everywhere, crowding out Moscow papers. The popularity of the press among the public that one might loosely call patriotic turns out to be another myth. A combined total of 8 percent gave marks of "5," "greatest importance," and "4," "considerable significance," to the PRAVDA group of papers; 23 percent gave such marks to IZVESTIYA and related papers; and 35 percent gave marks to local publications.

Most journalists believe that democratically oriented media dominate in the provinces, but that by no means attests to the success of reforms and triumph of democracy.

In the sociologists' opinion, professional self-awareness and feeling are most clearly reflected in answers to the question: "With what content do you invest the concept of the "fourth estate?" Only 17 percent believe that it reflects the real role of the mass media in society, while 21 percent of those surveyed claim that it sounds like a mockery. "The claim is an exaggeration," believe 56 percent of the journalists.

The survey revealed another feature of the times. In practically all the mass media outlets—even state ones; that is, those that receive state subsidies—the dependence on advertisers or sponsors has become stronger than the dependence on state "infusions."

Among the problems that concern journalists most (setting aside the financial problem and the problem of equipment, which is a derivative of the former), the most acute turned out to be the problem of legal support, and it proved most acute in the state media outlets. Evidently the independent media outlets are more outspoken and better adapted to today's far from hothouse conditions.

The provincial journalists give fairly high marks to the work of their capital city colleagues but without the least denigration of their own importance.

Provincial journalists hold very complex and contradictory feelings in their hearts. Participants in the

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survey were offered two columns of words, with a dozen words in each column. The columns were antithetical; that is, a word with a positive connotation in one column corresponded to one in the other with a negative connotation. For example, pride-humiliation. They were asked to choose no more than seven of the 24 words that most expressed their impressions of what was occurring in life. Their answers were not at all optimistic. The frequency of pride was 7, humiliation—19, vigorousness—7, fatigue—47, satisfaction—6, disappointment—31, prosperity—4, and poverty—20.

This section of the survey most vividly shows the psychological state of the provincial journalist. There are far more positions in this section than we have cited, but the main impression from reading it can be expressed in a single word: "sour."

Finally, the survey allowed respondents to give ratings to the Moscow newspapers that were the favorites of journalists in the surveyed regions: KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA received 24 points, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS—11, IZVESTIYA—10, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY—8, MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI—5, and KOMMERSANT and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA—2 each.

Readers' preferences are different. The list given above was mixed with tabloid and advertisement centered publications.

We shall not draw conclusions; in our view, the information cited speaks for itself. It is worth adding only that the sociological survey in its entirety is much more interesting than the excerpts presented from it and gives the most accurate and strict picture of the situation in which journalists in the Russian provinces live and work.

Regional Affairs

Decree on Minimum Wage Increase

954F2400A Yakutsk RESPUBLIKA SAKHA in Russian 29 Apr 95 p 1

[Decree of the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) on Increasing the Minimum Wage]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purpose of maintaining the population's standard of living and in conformity with RF Law "Increasing the Minimum Wage," dated 20 April 1995, No. 43-FZ:

1. The minimum wage is to be established in the amount of:

— effective 1 April 1995, 34,400 rubles;

— effective a May 1995, 43,700 rubles.

2. Effective 1 May 1995, the computation of the size of grants of aid to families having children, compensations as a result of the increase in the prices of food products, scholarships paid to school children and to students, postgraduate, and doctoral students in higher educational institutions, and of other social payments financed at the expense of funds from the republic budget and state nonbudgetary funds, the size of which has been established by legislation of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is to be carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this decree.

3. To establish, effective 1 May 1995, the tariff rate (salary) of Category 1 of the Uniform Tariff Scale for payment of the labor performed by workers at enterprises, institutions, and other organizations in the budgetary sphere that are financed from the republic budget, in the amount of 43,700 rubles a month.

4. To approve and to put into effect as of 1 May 1995 the Uniform Tariff Scale for payment of the labor performed by workers in the budgetary sphere in accordance with the appendix.

5. Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Ministry of Finance is to define the sources of financing of the expenses linked with the carrying out of the measures stipulated by paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this decree.

6. Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Ministry of Finance is to prepare for submittal to the State Assembly (Il Tumen) a draft of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Law "Making of Amendments to the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Law, dated 12 April 1995, No. 57-1, "The Consolidated Budget of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) for 1995,"and to submit it to the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) prior to 5 May 1995.

7. Effective 1 May 1995, to consider as being no longer in effect the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) decrees dated 30 May 1995, No. 118, and 5 April 1995, No. 132.

[Signed] Yu. Kaydyshev,

chairman of the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
Yakutsk, 28 April 1995

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Local Foreign Investment Potential Viewed

954F2400B Yakutsk RESPUBLIKA SAKHA in Russian 4 May 95 p 2

[Article by N. Baramygin, deputy representative of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in Japan: "Foreign Investments: The Republic's Unrevealed Potential"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yakutia is a part of the Russian Federation and, since it has state sovereignty, it has the right to conduct its own economic policy. Our republic is located in the Far Eastern Economic Region, and therefore it is natural that we must compare our achievements with the achievements of our neighbors. At such time it becomes clear that, as compared with Khabarovsk and Maritime krays and with Sakhalin, which have hundreds of joint ventures, we are lagging behind in the competition for attracting foreign investments.**

There are many explanations for this situation: the lack of ice-free seaports; the general remoteness from the sea; the lack of railroads on the greater part of the republic; the lack of direct air flights abroad; and the lack of any precise knowledge abroad concerning the republic.

In this regard I would like to compare the experience in attracting foreign capital and to understand what factors are the decisive ones allowing businessmen to make decisions about investments.

The Department of Industry of the government of Hongkong began in 1984 to conduct a study of foreign investments into the industry of that country.

The basic questions studied were: from what countries the investments came; the structure, size, and branch of industry for the companies with foreign investments; the volume of foreign investments by individual countries; the number of workers in the companies with foreign investments; and the sales volumes of those companies.

Then a more detailed study was made of the interests of the largest investor-countries, the investment potential of the leading branches of industry, the influence of foreign investors on the companies with foreign investments, and the providing of assistance to them. Consideration was taken of production operations, business opportunities, the problems and plans of those companies, the investment climate, and the prospects for foreign investments.

At this stage we are interested in the investment climate as being the most important indicator for making a decision about investments. In Hongkong, attention was paid to 12 factors. Foreign investors evaluated them according to importance in the following order: infrastructure; cost of manpower; banking and financial institutions; labor productivity; cost of leasing an office or accommodations for a factory; the government's economic policy; the availability of management personnel; the availability of professional technical cadres; the political climate; the regional situation; the potential of the local market; and the support of connected branches.

When considering those factors, one understands that the remoteness and narrowness of the local market are not the basic obstacles for foreign investors, and that the chief one is the availability of the infrastructure: roads, airports, and a strong banking system that has been integrated into the world banking community.

In this regard I would like to recall that much has already been done for this purpose in the republic. The AYaM [Amur-Yakutsk Mainland], the Yakutsk Air Terminal, motor roads, and many other items are under construction. And this beneficial work should be continued, despite the difficulties of the period. In addition, our "Sakhabank," "Yakutagroprombank," and "Yakutzolotobank" are becoming affiliated with a hundred of the largest banks in Russia. A large cohort of young people are attending various higher educational institutions, acquiring knowledge in management.

But what is, in my opinion, the most important negative factor is the fact that the republic still has an extremely insufficient number of close interpersonal ties with the entrepreneurial, scientific, and governmental circles of other countries and their regions.

Why is it that Moscow in the center, and Khabarovsk and Vladivostok in our region, are attracting foreign investments? It is largely because of the greater development of interpersonal ties. If one takes Japan as an example, practically everyone who has anything to do with Russia has been in Moscow, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok, and they all have broad circles of friends and acquaintances.

An important role here is played by the fact that the republic is a neighbor of the developed countries of Asia where the establishment of friendly ties requires many years of patient work. But Yakutia did not gain entry into the world until 1989, and we have not yet developed there a critical mass of ties, contacts, or capital.

Therefore today it is necessary to admit that it is precisely the visits made by republic president M. Nikolayev that have been providing a tangible impetus in developing close, friendly ties with the leadership of the countries and the largest world companies. This is also promoted by the network of the republic's representations in the country and abroad. The flow of information concerning the republic and ties with the

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regions of the Russian Federation and abroad are being established.

But the most important thing is our entrepreneurs' initiative, their ability to find profitable spheres for the investment of foreign capital, and their personal charisma, decency, and firm support on the part of the republic's leadership.

So there already exists a confidence today that the influx of investments into the country will grow and become stronger.

***Edict on Social-Economic Development of Kaliningrad Oblast**

954E1012A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 May 95 p 4

[Edict: "Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on the Social-Economic Development of Kaliningrad Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Taking into consideration the geographical position of Kaliningrad Oblast and its exceptional importance for the political, military-strategic, and economic interests of the Russian Federation, and also for purposes of creating favorable conditions for the stable socioeconomic development of Kaliningrad Oblast, strengthening its ties with other regions in the Russian Federation, promoting the development of foreign-economic cooperation, improving the border, customs, and migrational procedures on the territory of the oblast, and guided by Articles 5 and 80 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I decree:

1. The Government of the Russian Federation is:

a) to grant the head of the Kaliningrad Oblast administration the right to coordinate with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, if necessary, with other federal agencies of the executive authority, to conduct negotiations and conclude, within the confines of his powers, agreements with the administrative-territorial formations, as well as the ministries and departments, of foreign states.

To instruct the head of the Kaliningrad Oblast administration to submit to the Government of the Russian Federation proposals for creating an agency of regional cooperation between Kaliningrad Oblast and the administrative-territorial formations of the Lithuanian Republic;

b) to carry out, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, measures for the first-priority socioeconomic development of the oblast on the basis of special-purpose federal, interregional, and regional programs, to be submitted in the established procedure for approval by the Government of the Russian Federation.

In order to implement the special-purpose programs for the development of Kaliningrad Oblast, to define annually the sources and volumes of their financing.

When defining the volume of the state funds to be allocated for the financing of the federal program for the socioeconomic development of Kaliningrad Oblast, to take into consideration the expenditures for land-reclamation construction and the remodeling of drainage systems;

c) to develop, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, a series of measures for the socioeconomic protection of the local producers of agricultural output;

d) to review the proposals of the Kaliningrad Oblast administration with regard to the state support of the oblast's economic complex and to make the appropriate decision;

e) to provide in 1995, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, the necessary improvement and activation of motor-vehicle and railroad ferry crossings between the ports of Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg (Vyborg);

f) to review the question of creating — on the basis of the maritime administrations of the trade and fishing ports — a single maritime administration of the Kaliningrad port and the question of subordinating it to the RF Ministry of Transportation;

g) within the period of one month, to prepare and submit in the established procedure to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly a draft of the federal law concerning Kaliningrad Oblast;

h) to prepare, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, in conformity with Article 78 of the RF Constitution, a contract between the federal agencies of the executive authority and agencies of the executive authority of Kaliningrad Oblast;

i) to develop, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, a series of measures for the oblast's economic integration with other subjects of the Russian Federation;

j) to develop within the period of one month, jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, a federal program for providing services to the military personnel in Kaliningrad Oblast, stipulating in that program the measures for guaranteeing housing construction and the supply of food products, for increasing the security of the special-purpose warehouses, and recycling ammunition with the use of local resources;

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k) jointly with the Kaliningrad Oblast administration, to review the question of developing a free economic zone [SEZ] in Kaliningrad Oblast (the "Yantar" SEZ) and to make the appropriate proposals in the established procedure.

2. This Edict goes into effect on the day of its signing.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

Moscow, the Kremlin
18 May 1995
No. 495

***Nenets Separatism Cited as Example of Constitutional Conflict**

954E1012B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 May 95 p 6

[Article by Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Verkhovskiy, member of the Political Council of the regional organization of the "Russia's Democratic Choice" part, laboratory head at the ZapsibNIIGeofizika Institute, under rubric "Corridors of Power": "The United Nenets Emirates, or Game of Subjects on a Constitutional Field"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the latest ruckus broke out between the leadership of Tyumen Oblast and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The cause of the ruckus was the okrug Charter that had been adopted in late December.

On the very first complete work day of the new year, Leonid Roketskiy, head of the oblast administration, made a sharp statement over local television, in which he accused the okrug leadership of separatism, of having violated the Constitution, and of having infringed on the rights of the oblast population. Ten days later, a special session of the Tyumen Oblast Duma was held, with just one question on the agenda: "The Charter of Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug." The conflict was resolved in a surprisingly peaceful manner. The representatives of all three subjects of the federation — Tyumen Oblast and the Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs that are part of it — decided to put into their charters a coordinated section on reciprocal relations.

It would seem that there is no need to talk about anything else, if friendship has been victorious. But everything is not that simple. There exists the hypothesis that, if there were no war in Chechnya, the scenario for the development of the events linked with the adoption of the Charter of Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug might have been different. Most likely, the Yamalers yielded their positions so easily when they realized that, in January 1995, separatism in Russian had been out of fashion for a long time. **If There Were No War in Chechnya, a New Republic Might Have Appeared in Russia.**

For the time being, we shall not make a historical excursion into the period of the "parade of sovereignties," but shall only note that even then an attempt was made to restore the Yamal Republic, which attempt remained without any practical consequences. As one reads the okrug Charter, one inevitably comes to the conclusion that a second attempt to create a republic was noted, but this time in a more complicated version.

The deputy makeup that was newly elected in 1994 called itself the State Duma of Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The fact that this was not just a game of names, but a claim for the status of republic, was confirmed in the Charter. In paragraph 1 of Article 1 it is stated that Yamal-Nenets Okrug is a national-state formation. As is well known, only republics that are part of the Russian Federation possess this status. The okrug's State Duma called its Charter (in parentheses) the Basic Law, that is, a Constitution that is proper only for republics.

At the same time, having established unilaterally the change in its status, the Yamalers were in no rush to rename the okrug a republic, although they did firmly establish that possibility in the Charter: "The autonomous okrug independently decides the question of changing its name..."

Probably the authors of the Charter were well aware that a frontal decision — the self-proclaiming of the republic — has few chances of success. Behind individual articles in that Charter one discerns a more complicated scheme. Article 1, in addition to defining the status, provides a formulation of the okrug's goal: "...with a consideration of the extensive development of raw-material resources that guarantee Russia's strategic interests and the high percentage of the nonindigenous population of the autonomous okrug, its goals as compared with those that were originally established for a national okrug are being transformed into state tasks for implementing on the territory of the autonomous okrug the Arctic Policy of the Russian Federation."

I am not convinced that the Russian Federation suspects that it even has an Arctic Policy, much less one with capital letters. Otherwise neither the central nor the local newspapers would have kept repeating loudly that Russia does not have a clear-cut policy with respect to the North. Obviously, the Yamalers were also well aware of this. What we obviously have here is a different purpose. Having assumed the heavy burden of implementing the "Arctic Policy," the okrug (republic) gets the right one fine day to be indignant about its

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absence and to make harsh demands on the Center to develop and guarantee that policy.

Obviously one should not make a complete analogy here, but didn't the situation with Tatarstan and Chechnya develop according to a similar scheme? First those republics appeared and they occupied a rigid position, and the Russian Federation had nothing left to do but to develop a special policy with respect to them. In this regard Yamal is in no way worse, if one considers that its bowels contain tremendous reserves of natural gas and gas pipelines run from its territory to Siberia, to Russia, and to Europe.

Now let us ask the question: why, having given itself the strategic goal of implementing an Arctic policy, did the okrug nevertheless prefer the name of a national-state formation? After all, the same paragraph of the Charter recognized the high percentage of the nonindigenous population. But if one wants to be more precise, the share of the indigenous population in the okrug is only approximately 5 percent. That is, the number of representatives of what is currently called the titular ethnic group — the Nenets — living in the okrug is approximately one-tenth the number, for example, of Ukrainians.

Nevertheless it is precisely the Nenets who are that trump card which, according to the plan (obviously, a presumed one) of the fathers of the okrug's Constitution that could guarantee the creation of the new republic. In order to be convinced of this, let us read the Charter. Paragraph 4 of Article 2 lists all the subjects of the Federation that border on the okrug, including Nenets Autonomous Okrug on the west and Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug on the east. Upon becoming acquainted with this geographical excursion that was made part of the Basic Law, it is easy to recall that the age-old lands of the Nenets exist not only in Tyumen Oblast, but also extend along the coast of the Arctic Ocean almost from Murmansk to Taymyr inclusive (approximately 2000 kilometers). But, without hastening to make any conclusions, let us continue to read the Charter. The next paragraph, paragraph 5, contains a subtle hint: "At the present time the autonomous okrug is part of (is contained within the administrative-territorial borders of) Tyumen Oblast." Article 2, paragraph 6, ends as follows: "The borders of the autonomous okrug can be changed in accordance with the mutual consent of the interested subjects of the Russian Federation." This is already warmer. Finally, Article 5 puts everything in place. Its name is: "Reciprocal Relations With Subjects of the Russian Federation That Are Situated on Territories That Are Contiguous With It in the Arctic Zone." First that article described the "joint state interests" of the neighbors. Finally, the last paragraph states that the mentioned subjects can create joint agencies of interregional administration.

In combination with mutual consent for a change in the okrug borders, this fits precisely into the version concerning the preparation for the creation of the Nenets Republic under the slogan of the unification of the Nenets nation. The result would be a rather nice republic. In the west, the petroleum of Timan-Pechora province; in the center, the gas of Yamal; and in the east, Norilsk nickel. One could even propose a name for this alternative: the "United Nenets Emirates."

How Does One Divide the Petroleum and Gas Pie?

This alternative is fantastic only at first glance. Its implementation is not in large contradiction to the Constitution. It will also be not very surprising for the people of Tyumen Oblast. They will immediately remember that about two years ago an attempt was made to carry out a no less bold idea of creating the Mansi Republic. A package of documents was prepared, a newspaper was published, and meetings of "initiative groups" were even held in the three western rayons of Khanty-Mansi Okrug (those possessing reserves of petroleum and timber). After the creation of that republic, it was proposed that it become part of Sverdlovsk Oblast (under the slogan of the unification of the Mansi nation, individual representatives of which exist in Sverdlovsk Oblast). Then a completely clear trail of the initiators led to Yekaterinburg, and a Moscow trail was less clearly discernible. A criminal case involving this matter was initiated, but it died down.

Another question is how successful have such attempts been, how do they fit into the system of the state structure of Russia? In order to analyze this, let us now no longer avoid making an excursion into the recent past.

Let us recall April 1991. It was then that the "Novoogarevo process" began, the result of which was supposed to be the signing of a union treaty. It was at that time, on the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, that the subjects for the signing of the treaty arose. In addition to the union republic, all the administrative-territorial and national formations — krays and oblasts, and autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs — became such subjects. The meaning of this all-encompassing approach even then was read unambiguously as a means in the Center's fight against Russia, or, rather, against Yeltsin. Even if it was not predetermined by that decision, the "parade of sovereignties" was at least aggravated. Incidentally, the purpose of that "parade" in the overwhelming majority of in-

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stances was not so much the striving for national self-determination as it was a motivation for the political struggle or the partitioning of territories.

When Russia was confronted with the question of confining to some kind of banks the unbounded sovereignization, the thing hat was taken as the basis when concluding the Federative Treaty was that same Central Committee list, to which a new term was added —subjects of the Federation. That treaty, which subsequently was actually firmly established by the Constitution, not only legalized anew the Stalinist principle of the national-territorial structure of the state, but also firmly established certain changes in the territorial division of the country. In a wholesale manner, in the heat of attempting as rapidly as possible to resolve the epochal task of preserving the country's unity, the autonomous okrugs were included among the completely equal subjects of the Federation.

Currently their status lends itself with difficulty to logical perception. Although, according to the Constitution, they are independent subjects of the Federation, they are part of krays and oblasts that are also subjects. On the entire territory of the latter, including the okrugs, representative agencies of state authority are elected, once again in conformity with the Constitution. Such agencies are also elected in the okrugs. The former, having, in conformity with the principle of democracy (Article 3 of the Constitution), legal powers from the entire population of the krays and oblasts, attempt to extend those powers to the territory of the okrugs. The latter, citing the principle of equal rights of subjects of the Federation (Article 8 of the Constitution), attempt to reject those claims. That is the real basis of the permanent conflicts between the okrugs and Tyumen Oblast. The reason, naturally, is the wealth of the mineral resources of Tyumen, while is basically situated on the territory of the okrugs. Another reason for the discord between the okrugs and the oblast is the fact that those territories have changed substantially since the time when those okrugs were formed. Previously the population that predominated there was the indigenous population that gave the name to the okrugs, and the main products were fish, furs, and venison. Today the predominant population consists of outsiders who frequently reside here temporarily, and the main products are petroleum, gas, and timber. The striving of the okrugs that have become industrially developed territories to break away from the guardianship of the Tyumen that is situated hundreds of versts away is also understandable.

For Whom Was the Constitution Written?

Everything can be understood, and especially the fact that there are plenty of people who want to partition the country's territory. It is more important to understand what legal justifications exist for the partition that has actually already occurred in Tyumen Oblast.

The fact that the autonomous okrugs have exceptional rights distinguishing them from other subjects of the Federations is not despite the Constitution, but in complete conformity with it (if, of course, one disregards Article 5, where the equal rights of subjects of the Federation are proclaimed). Article 66 contains two paragraphs where those rights are stipulated in a special way. Paragraph 3 states, "Upon representation by the legislative and executive agencies of the autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug, a federal law on the autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug may be enacted." Article 4 states, "The relations of the autonomous okrugs that are part of a kray or oblast can be regulated by a federal law and treaty..."

There arises the completely natural question of how the okrugs are especially distinguished from everyone else in such a way that they have to be isolated and that there has to be a special stipulation in the Constitution for a complicated design for objects of the Federation that fit into one another like a set of Russian nesting dolls — krays and oblasts, with the okrugs that are part of them. Putting it in simpler terms, why was a fence put around this garden?

We might recall that the fight for the sovereignties that was begun by the Balts had the purpose of returning or acquiring a state system for individual nations (Chechnya, Tatarstan). That fight was based on the internationally recognized right of nations to self-determination and did not contradict the union Constitution that was in effect at that time.

But it is a different situation in the autonomous okrugs. The raising of their status to the level of oblasts and even republics, which action was planned in Yamal, has nothing to do with the national self-determination of the nations that gave their name to the okrugs, or, as is the term generally used, the titular ethnic groups. Even if the Nentsy, Khanty, and Mansi fought for the sovereignty of the okrugs on behalf of raising the level of the state system of their nations, they would scarcely be able to enjoy the fruits of their victory, considering the fact that their size in the population makeup constitutes from two to five percent. Correspondingly, the okrug agencies of authorities that are mentioned in Article 66 of the Constitution have only indirect relationship to the small-sized nations of the North, inasmuch as they were elected by the entire population in the usual procedure. The northern nationalities that have the special rights stipulated in the Constitution did not transfer any powers

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to those agencies. Therefore the autonomous okrugs, in essence, are ordinary subjects of the Federation.

As stated in Article 69 of the existing Constitution, "The Russian Federation guarantees the rights of the indigenous small-sized nations, in conformity with the generally recognized principles and norms of international laws and the international treaties of the Russian Federation," that is, the state acts as the guarantor of the special rights of those nations. So far as I know, the state also has not transferred those powers to anyone. The formation of national okrugs as long ago as the prewar days on territories where the small-sized nations constituted the majority of the population, was intended to guarantee their rights. It would seem that the current autonomous okrugs ought to have realized that function, and on a higher level. True, in order to do that it is definitely not necessary to have the status of a subject of the Federation, having received which the okrugs hastened to establish a complete set of representative and executive agencies that are proper for an ordinary oblast. The only thing that the okrugs were not concerned about was the creation of a special agency that would engage in supporting the life style of the aborigines. So the newly created Charter of Yamal-Nenets Okrug contains only general declarations with respect to realizing the rights of the small-sized nations. Putting it another way: the baby was thrown out with the bath water. Meanwhile the necessity for a real resolution of the problems of the northern nations is very acute. According to many indicators of the standard of living, they are somewhere among the poorest countries of Africa. During the past two or three years, that is, already during the period of the independence of the okrugs, their situation did not improve, but worsened.

I assume that it is obvious that there exist two questions that are practically unconnected with one another and that are to be decided separately. They are the partitioning of Tyumen Oblast and the guaranteeing of the rights of the small-sized peoples of the North.

Therefore the constitutional reinforcement of the special rights of the autonomous okrugs, at least for Tyumen Oblast, is, as a minimum, a mistake. But the Constitution is too serious a document to allow the very possibility of including in it any paragraphs on the basis of being incompletely thought out or on the basis of misunderstanding, however rapidly that was done.

In Tyumen it is no secret to anyone that it was not the Nentsy and the Khanty who fought for the sovereignty of the okrug and who were victorious, but it was others, under the pretext of, rather than on behalf of, the survival of the aborigines in the North. The meaning of that struggle consisted in the partitioning of the oblast territory that contains very rich mineral resources. The maximum benefit was won by the people at the peak of power in the okrugs, and certain people and departments in the center. The ones who won on the whole were the nonindigenous population, since the okrugs got their own budgets. At best, the indigenous population that is dying out remained in their previous position. The persons who obviously lost — materially and psychologically — were the residents of the southern part of the oblast. Obviously, the two last-mentioned categories also got something out of the deal, but in such a volume that they have the complete right to say, "We were robbed."

Did the authors of the Constitution understand this when they included additional paragraphs into Article 88? Probably yes. What, then — or, rather, who — pushed them into it? Possibly this is too bold a hypothesis, but it would seem that these paragraphs should be recognized as a victory of Russian lobbyism of an unprecedented world scale. The celebrated Western democracies, with their laws on lobbyism, did not dream of the possibility of introducing amendments into the country's Constitution in the interests of any departments. True, one should not disregard those who are attempting at whatever the costs to preserve the Stalinist national-territorial division of the country. Otherwise it is difficult to explain the unchangeability of the position of Ramazan Abdulatipov (beginning with the times when he occupied the position of department head in the CPSU Central Committee) with respect to the sovereignties of the okrugs, or the rate of activity in defending the interests of the okrugs (rather than the aborigines of the North) on the part of the present RF State Duma Committee on Nationality Affairs.

Isn't it time to decide the problems of Tyumen not in the interests of a narrow group of individuals, but in the interests of the entire population of an oblast that is very important in Russia? That will correspond both to the economic and the political interests of the entire country.

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